insert-headers-and-footers domain was triggered too early. This is usually an indicator for some code in the plugin or theme running too early. Translations should be loaded at the init action or later. Please see Debugging in WordPress for more information. (This message was added in version 6.7.0.) in /home/chosetfn/public_html/wp-includes/functions.php on line 6131Prisons are likely to become more – rather than less – significant centers of gravity for the jihadist movement. We discuss some ways in which prisons matter during the radicalization process.
Scholars suggest that an individual’s criminal past impacts possible terrorist futures for the jihadist movement. In particular, Basra et al.’s research has emerged four main themes.
The redemption narrative offers a radical change of values and behavior while encouraging a guilt-free sense of rebellion and anti-establishment. Crime is justified on religious grounds, whether or not the recruit has a religious background or understanding of Islam. In this instance, recruitment can be viewed as an unintended merging of criminal and jihadist narratives.
Prisons expose vulnerabilities in individuals susceptible to “cognitive openings” and the willingness to identify with new beliefs. Networking opportunities in prison lay the groundwork for radicalization, with rapid mobilization and solidification of radical beliefs occurring post-release.
Jihadists also take advantage of criminal skills in prison, such as connections to gangs and weapons, and the soft skill of staying under the radar by using fake documents and safe houses. Familiarity with violence is also considered a skill transfer, as recruits with violent pasts are less likely to be psychologically hesitant to commit violent terrorist acts.
Petty crime and criminal operations are known to finance terrorists, particularly their return to Syria. There has been a shift in terrorist financing from state-funded to micro-level self-funded methods (through criminal efforts). Jihadists also leverage the criminal financial strategy of encouraging a low barrier to entry, sharing their ideology to justify their crimes, and encouraging continued criminal behavior by simply shifting the purpose to meet jihadist ideals.
These findings challenge traditional views of radicalization and significantly impact counter-terrorism responses, forcing authorities to consider prisons a breeding ground for radicalization where, previously, foreign fighters were recruited from universities and places of religious worship.
Again, the criminal challenges of society (which now include terrorism) come back to addressing societal needs and effective rehabilitation efforts to impact change. Exploring this demands an entirely new discussion, but essentially, incorporating rehabilitation and post-release services as a priority in prisons rather than punitive measures could protect the vulnerable isolation of offenders and reduce recidivism (in the form of terrorist action).
There are several examples of jihadists who have emerged from the criminal-terrorist nexus in prison and caused severe damage. The case of Omar el-Hussein demonstrates both arguments — that prisons are a location for radicalization and that offenders are vulnerable people whose rehabilitation and reintegration are largely neglected.
El-Hussein was radicalized in prison and even red-flagged by authorities. After his release, a technicality prevented him from accessing probation services, leading him to be homeless and jobless, during which rapid radicalization occurred. Destitute and radicalized, he carried out the deadly shootings at a cultural center and a synagogue in Copenhagen in February 2015.
As borders have become more porous, criminal mobility has become more accessible, contributing to transnational crime. Let’s assess the push and pull factors contributing to Nigeria’s Black Axe migration to South Africa.
The Neo-Black Movement (NBM) began as a confraternity in Nigeria, Benin City. The group was established at the University of Benin during the 1970s as a student self-help association but gradually transformed into a criminal group in response to the political dictatorship in Nigeria, acting as a violent weapon to be used by political parties against the opposition.
The criminal splinter group became known as Black Axe and has since earned a notorious reputation for violence, murder, cult-like behavior, and transnational crime. While the legally-operating NBM has disassociated itself with Black Axe, many publications and research efforts still group the two organizations together. This analysis of their criminal mobility uses news articles, academic journals, and court documents to conclude that Black Axe began as an emergent criminal group due to political turmoil but has since developed to become a strategic, international organization. Headquartered in Nigeria, Black Axe “zones” are highly flexible, connected, and fluid, able to spread worldwide due to their flexibility and internal social bonds.
While most online literature focuses on Black Axe's presence in Italy, where they have been dubbed the “Nigerian Mafia,” I have selected to analyze their presence in South Africa due to my personal experience of witnessing Nigerian criminal organizations in action and my understanding of the South African landscape.
It is important to note that Black Axe's presence in Italy is strong, where criminal activity and methods differ greatly from that in South Africa — a discussion and analysis on its own.
Since the 1980s, Nigerian organized crime has migrated worldwide, developing a strong presence in Italy and South Africa. Today, Black Axe operates across Africa and Europe, and they also target the United States of America via the Internet.
Initially, the international migration of Nigerian criminal groups developed due to a combination of three factors: the surge of wealth and accompanying corruption due to the discovery of oil in the 1950s, the second economic depression in the 1980s, and widespread corruption that led to mass migration.
Due to pull factors, Black Axe and other Nigerian criminal organizations were established in South Africa, a fragile state with a high corruption and gang violence rate, making it an ideal location for facilitating various transnational criminal transactions.
Earlier reports of Black Axe operations in South Africa refer to drug trafficking crimes, where Axemen established strategic, operational bases near target clientele, such as brothels, and took advantage of South Africa’s post-apartheid political and social transition to succeed. Groups sometimes overtook entire neighborhoods, such as Hillbrow in Johannesburg.
Over time, the group adapted to flourish in cybercrimes such as internet fraud, romance scams, and money laundering to target international markets and leverage legal knowledge to avoid extradition and capture. South Africa has also served as a strategic springboard for Black Axe members to access more lucrative countries, such as Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. However, this does not necessarily describe transplantation, as the criminal operations and methods differ from one location to another.
It is important to note that the racial tension and inequality in South Africa have the potential to develop into a push factor, encouraging Nigerian criminal organizations to move (or perhaps adapt their criminal behavior) as xenophobia creates a hostile environment. Nigerian gangs (and non-criminal Nigerians) have been the victims of violent attacks, facing extortion and death.
Despite Nigeria’s consistency as a politically and economically unstable country, Black Axe remains headquartered in Benin City and operates in regional areas called “zones.” The development of trusted networks with shared criminal objectives is explained by Corentin Cohen, who says that “networks of individuals working together for solidarity, economic or political objectives became categorized as organized crime or as a mafia.”
During an investigation into the pressing cyber threat in Africa, Rory Corcoran, acting head of Interpol’s new Financial Crime and Anti-Corruption Centre, said, “We are dealing with a highly organized international network. These guys are not opportunists… We’re mapping them out around the world.”
Court documents allege that Black Axe maintains a pyramidal command structure with zones worldwide, with the worldwide headquarters based in Benin City in Nigeria. Although the headquarters are based in Nigeria, the organization is not localized, contradicting the existing research of a “mafia” organization.
Initially, it appears as though Black Axe demonstrates a unique convergence of both the importation/deprivation model of criminal mobility (as members are “pushed” out of a volatile home country in search of a better life) and the strategic, rational, and highly mobile theory of criminal mobility as the organization overlaps with the NBM and recruitment process is fairly strict, reflecting that of a confraternity.
A closer assessment of the group’s global expansion, strategic use of South Africa, and connection with the NBM suggest that Black Axe is predominantly a highly mobile and strategic organization with an operational base in Nigeria and territorial “zones” worldwide. The specific criminal activity and control methods differ depending on the environment of these territories, suggesting that these “zone” leaders have some authority to orchestrate actions and make international connections to thrive in the specific environment.
There are limitations in this analysis, with the following being the most significant.
Dan Bloom wrote an article for Daily Mail, introducing creative and innovative ways of trafficking drugs across borders and describing operations orchestrated by relatively small and loosely structured organizations.
These efforts, such as filling empty beer cans with narcotics and surgically implanting drugs in pet labradors, demonstrate the ever-evolving methods and techniques used by drug traffickers to move illegal substances across borders.
The smuggling and operational methods mentioned in Dan Bloom’s article can be grouped as follows:
Of the above, efforts where narcotics have been hidden in existing cargo present a rational and calculated chance of success. Hiding large volumes of contraband in unaccompanied, legitimate cargo presents an important smuggling strategy.
The necessary manpower is limited to supplying and receiving the narcotics, not the actual transition. As long as a connection with or access to a legitimate cargo company is established, large volumes of drugs can be trafficked via port entry without necessarily making the commercial shipper complicit in the scheme, reducing the risk of arrest and the number of players involved.
Most of the efforts mentioned in Dan Bloom’s article are carried out by couriers who have failed (without suggesting previous successes using the same method). The argument that using a courier is high risk aligns with Caulkins et al.’s paper that explores how illegal drugs enter the United Kingdom. The paper reveals that most interviewees acted as couriers and were caught on their first attempt at trafficking drugs, with the arrest risk being considerable, especially for novices (implying that there is a skill to master and succeed as a courier). Costs include the fee-for-service arrangement, the travel ticket, the cost of the drugs (limited to what a single person can carry or transport), and the high risk of a snitch.
Overall, using a courier is a small-time operation with high risk and moderate reward. Assessing the situation further, the existence of X-rays that can identify ingested narcotics and sniffer dogs that can smell a range of drugs at major airports increases the risk of discovery among commercial air couriers. Land and port border control also use scanning technology, but as reported by Bernstein in NBC Montana, CBP currently scans only 2% of all private passenger vehicles and 16% of commercial vehicles at land borders, suggesting that the risk of detection is fairly low compared to commercial air options.
One operational method not mentioned in Bloom’s article is using corrupt truck drivers to smuggle drugs across borders, arguably the most lucrative method with the lowest risk of being captured. Caulkins et al. describe how truck driver operations span several years without being caught, move large volumes of illicit cargo, and involve smaller groups of minor players to split profits.
Perhaps the fact that none of these “corrupt vehicle operator” efforts are mentioned in Bloom’s article is a testament to the success of the method, or perhaps the lack of this operational method on the list suggests that it is not creative enough to be featured. Regardless, this operational method offers relatively low barriers to entry with a high chance of success, making it a viable option for rationally-acting smuggling operations.
Research reveals a number of possible existential motivations for engaging in terrorism. Are these research findings important for understanding international terrorism, or are they unreliable?
When aligning with the positivist school of criminology, which considers internal or external influences on individuals as the primary cause of criminal behavior, it would be short-sighted to ignore the existential factors that motivate international terrorists.
Cottee & Hayward explore three existential motivations for engaging in terrorism, namely the desire for excitement, the desire for ultimate meaning, and the desire for glory.
The authors also describe the goal of terrorism as two-fold: pursuing the political goals of small groups and exploring the site of individual self-drama and self-reinvention.
Researching existential motivation demands a qualitative approach to research, which is used to find meanings, feelings, and underlying opinions, therefore playing an essential role in understanding why individuals engage in international terrorism.
Cottee & Hayward did a convincing job to shed light on the motivations for engaging in international terrorism and how to manage the threat by exploring how terrorist agents feel and the emotional complexity of terrorism. However, other efforts are necessary for a more holistic understanding of the phenomenon.
Bruinsma & Bernasco discuss the social network theory in line with other transnational crimes, describing social collaboration and organization in light of financial and legal risks. International terrorism suggests that the rewards are more “existential,” which introduces difficulty in applying the social network theory (which is focused on social organizations surrounding financial and legal risks).
Even so, international terrorist groups seem to consist of close-knit, cohesive, and ethically homogenous groups of people with shared spiritual or political beliefs, likening them to Bruinsma & Bernasco’s description of smuggling and large-scale heroin trading groups.
Perry & Hasisi move away from the positivist school of criminology and discuss rational choice theory to review the religious, personal, and social incentives demonstrated by those who kill themselves in suicide attacks.
They argue that suicide bombers (in particular) are driven by the anticipation of costs and benefits, and they are committed to maximizing self-gratifying, beneficial behavior.
Reviewing both theories closely, it’s possible to draw parallels between positivist and classical approaches and determine the overlaps in religious motivation and the desire to elevate the self. Both require a focus on mentality and empirical research, which ‘reads between the lines’ of quantitative research to understand social phenomena better.
Outside of the terrorist agent, modern developments also play a significant role in the increase in international terrorism, such as improved communication technologies, deregulated financial markets, and increased flow of people and products across borders.
All of these external factors should be considered in conjunction with internal and existential factors to gain a better understanding of the rise of international terrorism. As a unique transnational crime that includes a strong political agenda instead of a financial one, international terrorism demands a closer look at the existential motives, making Cottee & Hayward’s reading valuable.
The ambiguity of numbers and statistics has the potential for misleading interpretations, as is evident in the case of seizing and interdicting drugs at and beyond U.S. borders. Why is measuring interdiction “success” politically tricky?
Not only are drug seizure figures used as evidence for policy success, but they remain largely unchallenged while serving multiple interests (and functions) for different state departments.
Peter Andreas explores how “mythical numbers” occur due to various reasons. For example, he mentions that some numbers are noticeably missing, some are recycled through the media without accountability, and unimpressive numbers are suppressed. These issues, and more, present interdiction success as “decorations” for the policy process.
Essentially, these issues boil down to the lack of accountability for the purity of the figures and their source, an issue that is aggravated by different government agencies competing against one another for budget allocation and politicians attempting to prove policy success.
Using the US border as a battleground between Democrats and Republicans is a tale as old as time, with Republicans attempting to control illicit drug flow and immigration as a priority to advance their agenda.
Consider President Nixon’s Operation Intercept, an anti-drug measure that resulted in a near shutdown of border crossings between Mexico and the United States in 1969, a significant effort in his campaign. The practice of using misleading numbers is still prevalent today.
Justin Reid describes Operation Intercept as “an exercise in international extortion” where journalists reported questionable statistics provided by the government to promote (and question) Nixon’s upcoming war on drugs, which followed two years later.
The practice of using misleading numbers is still prevalent today. The Marshall Project published an article demonstrating how political leaders amplify specific figures and shift metrics to further their campaign and policy agenda. An investigation of Operation Lone Star reveals how Texas Governor Greg Abbott skewed data to describe a multi-billion dollar border operation as successful in an effort to get re-elected.
An investigation by ProPublica, The Texas Tribune, and The Marshall Project found, “The state’s claim of success has been based on shifting metrics that included crimes with no connection to the border, work conducted by troopers stationed in targeted counties prior to the operation, and arrest and drug seizure efforts that do not clearly distinguish DPS’s role from that of other agencies.” The article is quite in-depth and dives into specific details of Operation Lone Star and how the figures were used as weapons in the fight to support Governor Abbott’s policy goal of securing the border (and getting reelected).
This commentary would only be complete by mentioning that policy is challenging to measure with complete transparency, attention to specific (relevant) indicators, and accountability. In the illicit flow of goods, money, and people, where gathering and measuring data is even more challenging, attention to reliability and validity is very important. Using the US border as an example, it's apparent how policy and the reaction to transnational crime has an impact on the US criminal justice system (and global efforts to target cross-border crimes).
Nigeria has several criminal organizations that conduct various illicit activities, including human trafficking, smuggling, drug trafficking, and cybercrime (Anisulowo, 2022). In the past decade, the Black Axe has become one of the most powerful and deadly criminal groups originating from Nigeria, with a presence throughout Africa, Europe, Asia, and North America (Judah et al., 2021).
The global nature of Black Axe has led to different understandings of the group, and the media depiction of the organization varies depending on the geographical source.
Within Nigeria, Black Axe is presented as a violent group of young men who threaten the local community by committing murder, kidnappings, and human trafficking (Babajide, 2021).
Around the world, Black Axe has been described as a “new kind of mafia” or a “new mob” (The Mob Reporter, 2016). Focused on cybercrime, their illicit activities are mostly non-violent but still destructive.
By conducting a LexisNexis search on Black Axe and their culture, I have concluded three dominant themes: cult membership, secrecy, and space. By exploring these themes, I aim to describe the cultural understanding of the Black Axe as depicted in the public realm, concluding that Black Axe is seen as a mysterious threat shrouded in secrecy.
The following content analysis was conducted using a LexisNexis search on Google, cross-referencing with related articles from the Lloyd Sealy Library. Collecting information from public records and various data sources offered insights into Black Axe's cultural attributes.
After an initial search on Google using the keywords Nigerian criminal organizations and culture, it became apparent that Black Axe is one of the most prolific and widely-reported groups in Google’s top results and news stories. I further refined the search to include keywords such as Black Axe culture, how do the Nigerian criminal organizations work, Nigerian criminal organizations structure, and relationship between Black Axe and government Nigeria.
I repeated these search terms in the Lloyd Sealy Library, where three significant articles were listed for Nigerian criminal organizations and culture. These articles include Linking Organizational Justice to Organizational Commitment Among Nigerian Police Officers (Sun et al. 2021), Italian Cops Try to Stop a Sex Trafficking Gang Called Black Axe (All Things Considered, 2018), and Pirate Towns: Reworking Social and Symbolic Infrastructures in Johannesburg and Douala (Simone, 2006).
Despite many Google articles and publications on Black Axe, there is very little information about the organization from academic sources, supporting the suggestion that the Nigerian criminal organization has not been studied, adding to the group’s reputation of secrecy.
Search results focused on the origins of Black Axe, how the group has expanded worldwide, and why they are seen as a significant threat. As several articles referenced Black Axe as a “new mafia,” I considered the comparison of Black Axe as a modern criminal syndicate to the traditional mafia, using the seven characteristics of the mafia as described by Reuter and Paoli (2020).
By exploring dominant themes of cult structure, secrecy, and space, it is apparent that Black Axe is not comparable to the traditional mafia despite global headlines.
Before Black Axe was a known criminal threat, the Neo-Black Movement (NBM) of Africa began as a student fraternity founded in 1977 at the University of Benin in Benin City in Edo State (Luxury Drop, 2022). NBM initially aimed to oppose injustice and move against dictatorship (Höhn, 2021). NBM quickly evolved into a criminal splinter group known as Black Axe.
The NBM continues to exist by its own name as a legally recognized business with the Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission, with a self-reported 30,000 members and connections to high-profile politicians and philanthropic activities.
Various publications reference the NBM and Black Axe as synonymous, such as the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Refworld, 2012). However, the NBM has publicly disassociated itself from the Black Axe confraternity, notoriously known for dealing drugs, smuggling, and human trafficking (Daily Trust, 2021).
Typically referenced as a “cult” and “confraternity,” most of Black Axe's cultural attributes are speculated and/or unconfirmed. Reasons for joining Black Axe range from the potential to earn money and networking for safety (Luxury Drop, 2022) to forcibly recruiting members (Refworld, 2012).
Membership is reserved for educated males, and there is a stringent, secretive initiation process whereby recruits take an oath of allegiance. Once joining as a confraternity member, the commitment remains strong due to the spiritual link throughout the initiation process, which sometimes takes members to the verge of death.
Some sources claim that Axemen are stripped naked and forced to lie in mud while enduring severe physical abuse, crawl through their tormentors’ legs in a process known as “devil’s passage,” and drink blood (Luxury Drop, 2022). Other sources suggest that initiation ceremonies include bonfires, drugs, and the rape of women (Refworld, 2012). These descriptions instill an image of fear, violence, and cultism.
Axemen are identified by their clothing: black pants, a long-sleeved white shirt, a black beret, and a black coat with the axe insignia (Refworld, 2012). The black axe is also present in their logo, which features a black axe cutting the chains of a black man, with the word “AYE” below. For this reason, the “street cult” group is also called “the Aye” (Anazia, 2017).
Black Axe is known to use the threat of death against members wanting to leave or break the silence fundamental to the group’s membership and initiation process (Judah et al., 2021). The group is not revered by Nigerian people but feared as the Black Axe has a history of confraternity and connection to cultism, kidnappings, violence with rival gangs, and killings (Simwa & Walubengo, 2022).
Despite the information available on Black Axe, the group remains mysterious. There are alleged links to politics, with a few known Black Axe members holding high positions in politics or business (Höhn, 2021). Yet the goal of Black Axe is not to achieve political domain but to penetrate politics to empower their own criminal agenda. Reports mention Nigeria has a long history of electoral violence (Carboni & Serwat, 2023), and Black Axe members play a significant role in instilling fear among voters (Shehu, 2021).
Examples of known Black Axe members who hold (or have held) political power include Augustus Bemigho and Tony Kabaka (Ukpong, 2021), the latter of who was briefly revered by the youth only to have his home riddled with bullets.
There is also reference made to Black Axe receiving money from officials, which has further aggravated rival-gang violence (Refworld, 2012). These corrupt political connections have contributed to hundreds of unsolved murders and multi-million dollar internet fraud globally (Sahara Reporters, 2021), with a lack of conviction for corruption (Hoffmann et al., 2016). It appears that Black Axe is working with (and in) the government but not for the benefit of the Nigerian people.
Black Axe has become one of the most notorious criminal groups worldwide, with a presence throughout Africa, Europe, Asia, and North America. With an estimated membership of over 30,000 people, their expansion has been credited to meticulous planning, dividing geographic areas into zones, and designation of local chiefs. These zonal chiefs collect dues from persons in their jurisdiction (similar to membership fees) and forward the money to leaders in Nigeria (Luxury Drop, 2022).
While Black Axe is known for violence, cult killings, human trafficking, and smuggling in Nigeria, its global reputation seems less violent. Most international reports describe the “mafia-like network of cells” (Shehu, 2021) as a Pan-African movement that has lost its way (Williams, 2012), presenting a criminal threat through highly sophisticated cybercrime efforts, among other crimes including sexual exploitation (Becucci, 2022).
Black Axe has been described as one of the “gangs behind online fraud” (Vice, 2021) and has inspired the collective efforts of Interpol, national criminal investigation units, and other intelligence agencies.
Ultimately, Black Axe is seen as a mysterious and sinister cult-like mafia group with secret initiation ceremonies. Their cultural identity in Nigeria seems to differ from their identity abroad. Foreign media portrays Black Axe as a new type of mafia or mob, as their criminal activities are viewed through a European understanding of criminal syndicates.
While it is apparent that Black Axe operations and targets differ depending on their geographical location, there is insufficient academic research and certainty about Black Axe dynamics to dive deeper.
How, if at all, do Transnational Organized Criminals (TOCs) affect the US criminal Justice System?
First, it is important to differentiate between the threat of transnational organized crime and transnational organized criminals. The difference is often overlooked among scholars when discussing where the government should focus its efforts to combat transnational organized crime.
As Phil Williams describes, transnational organized crime refers to criminal organizations or activities that cross national borders and, therefore, involve the territories and laws of at least two states.
The movement of illicit goods and services involves various countries, with different stages of planning, execution, and distribution crossing national borders.
Some of the most threatening examples of transnational crime include drug trafficking, human trafficking, firearms trafficking, corruption, cybercrime, piracy, money laundering, and ecological crime. In many instances, these crimes overlap with one another as networks overlap and take advantage of respective illegal activities.
Consider the enterprise theory, which suggests market dynamics create space for illicit businesses to operate, and success is determined by supply and demand (Lyman, 2006). The UNODC has said, “strategies aimed at the groups will not stop the illicit activities if the dynamics of the market remain unaddressed” (Williams, 2012).
Coupled with the understanding that groups engaged in a criminal enterprise are loosely structured, flexible, and highly adaptable, it puts forward a compelling argument that most of the power of transnational crime lies in the activities/market and not the people committing the acts. As such, one could argue that transnational organized crime affects the US criminal justice system more than individual criminals (or groups).
Transnational organized criminals affect the US criminal justice system in various ways. Consider the following as a starting point.
Corruption (and violence) play a critical role in transnational organized crime by neutralizing and weakening the state's power. As Williams describes, the very design of corruption is to undermine the judicial system (2012). Lyman continues to discuss the corruption link, which he describes as the “subtle interplay among many community forces” which make accommodations for organized crime within the criminal justice system (2006).
On a high level, drug trafficking organizations develop a symbiotic relationship with state structures and legitimate businesses which makes drug trafficking possible. A Homeland security report from 2010 suggests that Border Patrol seems to be the biggest target for drug traffickers and has the most corruption.
The actions of transnational organized criminals present a threat to security on a state and societal level. As TOCs, and drug trafficking, jeopardize the global trend toward peace, freedom, and national security, they jeopardize a nation’s identity (Dordevic, 2009). This includes its form of government, policies, and the perception of the state in the realm of international relations.
Political security is grounded in institutional stability and the political systems of the state (such as the criminal justice system), which are compromised through corruption and relationships with transnational organized criminals. As organized crime undermines efforts to provide sound governance (Williams, 2012), citizens lose faith in the government, authorities, and the criminal justice system, further compromising societal security.
On a lower level, drug trafficking increases violence and street corruption as various gangs battle for territory and distribution, such as the Bloods, Latin Kings, and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). The brutality of MS-13 members, with roots in El Salvador, and their power on the streets were recently highlighted in the news (Helmore, 2022).
Drugs are transported into and through New York by couriers on trains and buses before being smuggled further into Canada through nine land ports of entry. This distribution further taints America’s reputation for security, introduces the risk of violence to civilians, and places strain on local law enforcement.
Dordevic mentioned the ecological, economic, social, and political threats of TOCs to show how these illicit organizations surpassed conventional threats before the Cold War. In drug trafficking, these threats may manifest as erosion of human capital, increased conflict, rise in corruption, and public distrust, which creates a sense of insecurity (2009).
The actions of transnational organized criminals place the US criminal justice system in a difficult position as organizations exploit criminogenic asymmetries by taking part in jurisdictional arbitrage, looking for contradictions to leverage in their favor (Williams, 2012). The US criminal justice is forced to reassess weak laws and consider how the laws of neighboring countries impact the success of transnational organized crime.
In the average police department and community, drug trafficking undermines the efforts to provide sound governance by creating a strain on government institutions through corruption, increasing the threat to the national image, increasing public trust in authorities, and putting pressure on limited resources.
The convergence of TOC networks often amplifies the threat, and these activities should not be studied alone. For example, drug trafficking is often committed alongside money laundering and corruption.
These threats amplify where there is existing weak, unsettled, or ineffective governance. For example, communities within swing states, such as Pennsylvania and Minnesota, may have higher political tension and will look to authorities for security and effectiveness in handling the economic and social threats of drug trafficking, such as corruption and violence.