As borders have become more porous, criminal mobility has become more accessible, contributing to transnational crime. Let’s assess the push and pull factors contributing to Nigeria’s Black Axe migration to South Africa.
Introduction to black axe
The Neo-Black Movement (NBM) began as a confraternity in Nigeria, Benin City. The group was established at the University of Benin during the 1970s as a student self-help association but gradually transformed into a criminal group in response to the political dictatorship in Nigeria, acting as a violent weapon to be used by political parties against the opposition.
The criminal splinter group became known as Black Axe and has since earned a notorious reputation for violence, murder, cult-like behavior, and transnational crime. While the legally-operating NBM has disassociated itself with Black Axe, many publications and research efforts still group the two organizations together. This analysis of their criminal mobility uses news articles, academic journals, and court documents to conclude that Black Axe began as an emergent criminal group due to political turmoil but has since developed to become a strategic, international organization. Headquartered in Nigeria, Black Axe “zones” are highly flexible, connected, and fluid, able to spread worldwide due to their flexibility and internal social bonds.
While most online literature focuses on Black Axe's presence in Italy, where they have been dubbed the “Nigerian Mafia,” I have selected to analyze their presence in South Africa due to my personal experience of witnessing Nigerian criminal organizations in action and my understanding of the South African landscape.
It is important to note that Black Axe's presence in Italy is strong, where criminal activity and methods differ greatly from that in South Africa — a discussion and analysis on its own.
General Impression of the Global Dimension of the Group
Since the 1980s, Nigerian organized crime has migrated worldwide, developing a strong presence in Italy and South Africa. Today, Black Axe operates across Africa and Europe, and they also target the United States of America via the Internet.
Push factors prompting migration of Black Axe
Initially, the international migration of Nigerian criminal groups developed due to a combination of three factors: the surge of wealth and accompanying corruption due to the discovery of oil in the 1950s, the second economic depression in the 1980s, and widespread corruption that led to mass migration.
South African pull factors
Due to pull factors, Black Axe and other Nigerian criminal organizations were established in South Africa, a fragile state with a high corruption and gang violence rate, making it an ideal location for facilitating various transnational criminal transactions.
Earlier reports of Black Axe operations in South Africa refer to drug trafficking crimes, where Axemen established strategic, operational bases near target clientele, such as brothels, and took advantage of South Africa’s post-apartheid political and social transition to succeed. Groups sometimes overtook entire neighborhoods, such as Hillbrow in Johannesburg.
Over time, the group adapted to flourish in cybercrimes such as internet fraud, romance scams, and money laundering to target international markets and leverage legal knowledge to avoid extradition and capture. South Africa has also served as a strategic springboard for Black Axe members to access more lucrative countries, such as Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. However, this does not necessarily describe transplantation, as the criminal operations and methods differ from one location to another.
South African PUSH factors
It is important to note that the racial tension and inequality in South Africa have the potential to develop into a push factor, encouraging Nigerian criminal organizations to move (or perhaps adapt their criminal behavior) as xenophobia creates a hostile environment. Nigerian gangs (and non-criminal Nigerians) have been the victims of violent attacks, facing extortion and death.
Black Axe networks
Despite Nigeria’s consistency as a politically and economically unstable country, Black Axe remains headquartered in Benin City and operates in regional areas called “zones.” The development of trusted networks with shared criminal objectives is explained by Corentin Cohen, who says that “networks of individuals working together for solidarity, economic or political objectives became categorized as organized crime or as a mafia.”
During an investigation into the pressing cyber threat in Africa, Rory Corcoran, acting head of Interpol’s new Financial Crime and Anti-Corruption Centre, said, “We are dealing with a highly organized international network. These guys are not opportunists… We’re mapping them out around the world.”
Court documents allege that Black Axe maintains a pyramidal command structure with zones worldwide, with the worldwide headquarters based in Benin City in Nigeria. Although the headquarters are based in Nigeria, the organization is not localized, contradicting the existing research of a “mafia” organization.
Criminal Mobility of Black Axe Members
Initially, it appears as though Black Axe demonstrates a unique convergence of both the importation/deprivation model of criminal mobility (as members are “pushed” out of a volatile home country in search of a better life) and the strategic, rational, and highly mobile theory of criminal mobility as the organization overlaps with the NBM and recruitment process is fairly strict, reflecting that of a confraternity.
A closer assessment of the group’s global expansion, strategic use of South Africa, and connection with the NBM suggest that Black Axe is predominantly a highly mobile and strategic organization with an operational base in Nigeria and territorial “zones” worldwide. The specific criminal activity and control methods differ depending on the environment of these territories, suggesting that these “zone” leaders have some authority to orchestrate actions and make international connections to thrive in the specific environment.
Limitations in the analysis
There are limitations in this analysis, with the following being the most significant.
- The overlap with the NBM makes it difficult to identify Black Axe members in leadership who buffer themselves from criminal activity.
- Sensationalized headlines mislead the reality of the group’s progression from dealing drugs to romance scams in South Africa, such as the BBC’s headline The ultra-violent cult that became a global mafia.
- The secrecy surrounding the Black Axe confraternity cult’s origins and methods makes it difficult to investigate true motives, recruitment methods, and strategies for expansion.
- Using the example of Italy and South Africa, Black Axe, it is obvious that different primary crimes and methods in various regions make it difficult to assess the criminal organization as a whole.
- Alikening Black Axe and the “Nigerian Mafia” to the Italian mafia introduces misconceptions about the organization, including their origins and methods.
References
- Becucci, S. (2022). Nigerian criminal groups in Italy: Organizational structure, drug trafficking and sexual exploitation. Quaderni Di Sociologia, (88–XLVI), 71–91. https://doi.org/10.4000/qds.4839
- Bernardo, C. (2017). Migration of the Nigerian mafia. University of Cape Town News. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2017-05-16-migration-of-the-nigerian-mafia.
- Burke, J. (2022). Gangs of cybercriminals expanding across Africa, investigators say. The Guardian. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/nov/27/gangs-of-cybercriminals-are-expanding-across-africa-investigators-say.
- Campana, P. (2011). Eavesdropping on the Mob: The Functional Diversification of Mafia Activities across Territories, European Journal of Criminology, 8(3), 213–228.
- Cohen, C. (2022). The “Nigerian mafia” feedback loop: European police, global media, and Nigerian civil society. Trends Organ Crim. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-022-09471-0
- Daily Trust. (December 29, 2021). Neo-Black Movement dissociates itself from cult group, Black Axe. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://dailytrust.com/neo-black-movement-dissociates-self-from-cult-group-black-axe/
- Dolley, C. (2022). Clash of the cartels: Unmasking the global drug kingpins stalking South Africa. Maverick 451. Evans, J. (2023). Alleged ‘Black Axe’ scammers challenging extradition to US. News 24. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/alleged-black-axe-scammers-challenging-extradition-to-us-20230607
- Hassan, T. (2022). Nigeria: Events of 2022. Human Rights Watch. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/nigeria.
- Hyman, A. (2021). Nigerian mafia leaders arrested after Hawks swoop in Cape Town. Times Live. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-10-19-nigerian-mafia-leaders-arrested-as-sa-and-us-forces-swoop-in-cape-town/.
- Interpol. (2022). Financial crime: South African fraud gang dismantled. Interpol News and Events. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2022/Financial-crime-South-African-fraud-gang-dismantled.
- Mail & Guardian. (2002). Nigerians dominate cocaine trade in SA. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://mg.co.za/article/2002-05-08-nigerians-dominate-cocaine-trade-in-sa/.
- Northcott, C., Judah, S., & Macjob, P. (2021). The ultra-violent cult that became a global mafia. BBC. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59614595
- Nwakuonr, G.A. & Nwanne, C. (2018). Why South Africans attack Nigerians. The Guardian. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://guardian.ng/features/why-south-africans-attack-nigerians/.
- SAFLII. (September, 2022). Osagiede and Others v S (A95/22) [2022] ZAWCHC 166; [2022] 4 All SA 845 (WCC). Accessed on September 17, 2023, from http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2022/166.html.
- United States of America v. Osagiede, 2021R00423/JLH/W. (United States District Court of New Jersey). Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.justice.gov/d9/press-releases/attachments/2021/10/20/osagiedeetal.indictment_0.pdf.
Dan Bloom wrote an article for Daily Mail, introducing creative and innovative ways of trafficking drugs across borders and describing operations orchestrated by relatively small and loosely structured organizations.
These efforts, such as filling empty beer cans with narcotics and surgically implanting drugs in pet labradors, demonstrate the ever-evolving methods and techniques used by drug traffickers to move illegal substances across borders.
Smuggling and Operational Methods
The smuggling and operational methods mentioned in Dan Bloom’s article can be grouped as follows:
- Commercial air courier operations, such as someone using a skull-shaped packet of cocaine under a black wig while flying
- Couriers using other modes of transport, such as smuggling marijuana on a surfboard across the US-Mexico border
- Hiding drugs among unaccompanied legitimate commerce, such as traffickers filling furniture with more than five tonnes of cannabis, worth £12 million, through a port on the coast of England (the details of the drugs being unaccompanied among legitimate cargo are assumed from the article but not confirmed)
Calculated Chance of Success
Of the above, efforts where narcotics have been hidden in existing cargo present a rational and calculated chance of success. Hiding large volumes of contraband in unaccompanied, legitimate cargo presents an important smuggling strategy.
The necessary manpower is limited to supplying and receiving the narcotics, not the actual transition. As long as a connection with or access to a legitimate cargo company is established, large volumes of drugs can be trafficked via port entry without necessarily making the commercial shipper complicit in the scheme, reducing the risk of arrest and the number of players involved.
The Risk of Couriers
Most of the efforts mentioned in Dan Bloom’s article are carried out by couriers who have failed (without suggesting previous successes using the same method). The argument that using a courier is high risk aligns with Caulkins et al.’s paper that explores how illegal drugs enter the United Kingdom. The paper reveals that most interviewees acted as couriers and were caught on their first attempt at trafficking drugs, with the arrest risk being considerable, especially for novices (implying that there is a skill to master and succeed as a courier). Costs include the fee-for-service arrangement, the travel ticket, the cost of the drugs (limited to what a single person can carry or transport), and the high risk of a snitch.
Overall, using a courier is a small-time operation with high risk and moderate reward. Assessing the situation further, the existence of X-rays that can identify ingested narcotics and sniffer dogs that can smell a range of drugs at major airports increases the risk of discovery among commercial air couriers. Land and port border control also use scanning technology, but as reported by Bernstein in NBC Montana, CBP currently scans only 2% of all private passenger vehicles and 16% of commercial vehicles at land borders, suggesting that the risk of detection is fairly low compared to commercial air options.
Additional operational Methods
One operational method not mentioned in Bloom’s article is using corrupt truck drivers to smuggle drugs across borders, arguably the most lucrative method with the lowest risk of being captured. Caulkins et al. describe how truck driver operations span several years without being caught, move large volumes of illicit cargo, and involve smaller groups of minor players to split profits.
Perhaps the fact that none of these “corrupt vehicle operator” efforts are mentioned in Bloom’s article is a testament to the success of the method, or perhaps the lack of this operational method on the list suggests that it is not creative enough to be featured. Regardless, this operational method offers relatively low barriers to entry with a high chance of success, making it a viable option for rationally-acting smuggling operations.
References
- Bernstein, L. (2019). Vehicle scanning technology at the border is about to ruin the drug trade. NBC Montana. Accessed on September 10, 2023, from https://nbcmontana.com/news/nation-world/vehicle-scanning-technology-at-the-border-is-about-to-ruin-the-drug-trade
- Bloom, D. (2009). Busted! Ingenious (but failed) attempts by the world's drug dealers to outsmart customs using fake nappies, surfboards, and bottles of Champagne. Mail Online. Accessed on September 10, 2023, from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2711652/Busted-Ingenious-failed-attempts-world-s-drug-dealers-outsmart-customs-using-fake-nappies-surfboards-bottles-Champagne.html
- Caulkins, J.P., Burnett, H., & Leslie, E. (2009). How illegal drugs enter an island country: Insights from interviews with incarcerated smugglers. Global Crime 10(1&2), 66-93