As borders have become more porous, criminal mobility has become more accessible, contributing to transnational crime. Let’s assess the push and pull factors contributing to Nigeria’s Black Axe migration to South Africa.
Introduction to black axe
The Neo-Black Movement (NBM) began as a confraternity in Nigeria, Benin City. The group was established at the University of Benin during the 1970s as a student self-help association but gradually transformed into a criminal group in response to the political dictatorship in Nigeria, acting as a violent weapon to be used by political parties against the opposition.
The criminal splinter group became known as Black Axe and has since earned a notorious reputation for violence, murder, cult-like behavior, and transnational crime. While the legally-operating NBM has disassociated itself with Black Axe, many publications and research efforts still group the two organizations together. This analysis of their criminal mobility uses news articles, academic journals, and court documents to conclude that Black Axe began as an emergent criminal group due to political turmoil but has since developed to become a strategic, international organization. Headquartered in Nigeria, Black Axe “zones” are highly flexible, connected, and fluid, able to spread worldwide due to their flexibility and internal social bonds.
While most online literature focuses on Black Axe's presence in Italy, where they have been dubbed the “Nigerian Mafia,” I have selected to analyze their presence in South Africa due to my personal experience of witnessing Nigerian criminal organizations in action and my understanding of the South African landscape.
It is important to note that Black Axe's presence in Italy is strong, where criminal activity and methods differ greatly from that in South Africa — a discussion and analysis on its own.
General Impression of the Global Dimension of the Group
Since the 1980s, Nigerian organized crime has migrated worldwide, developing a strong presence in Italy and South Africa. Today, Black Axe operates across Africa and Europe, and they also target the United States of America via the Internet.
Push factors prompting migration of Black Axe
Initially, the international migration of Nigerian criminal groups developed due to a combination of three factors: the surge of wealth and accompanying corruption due to the discovery of oil in the 1950s, the second economic depression in the 1980s, and widespread corruption that led to mass migration.
South African pull factors
Due to pull factors, Black Axe and other Nigerian criminal organizations were established in South Africa, a fragile state with a high corruption and gang violence rate, making it an ideal location for facilitating various transnational criminal transactions.
Earlier reports of Black Axe operations in South Africa refer to drug trafficking crimes, where Axemen established strategic, operational bases near target clientele, such as brothels, and took advantage of South Africa’s post-apartheid political and social transition to succeed. Groups sometimes overtook entire neighborhoods, such as Hillbrow in Johannesburg.
Over time, the group adapted to flourish in cybercrimes such as internet fraud, romance scams, and money laundering to target international markets and leverage legal knowledge to avoid extradition and capture. South Africa has also served as a strategic springboard for Black Axe members to access more lucrative countries, such as Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. However, this does not necessarily describe transplantation, as the criminal operations and methods differ from one location to another.
South African PUSH factors
It is important to note that the racial tension and inequality in South Africa have the potential to develop into a push factor, encouraging Nigerian criminal organizations to move (or perhaps adapt their criminal behavior) as xenophobia creates a hostile environment. Nigerian gangs (and non-criminal Nigerians) have been the victims of violent attacks, facing extortion and death.
Black Axe networks
Despite Nigeria’s consistency as a politically and economically unstable country, Black Axe remains headquartered in Benin City and operates in regional areas called “zones.” The development of trusted networks with shared criminal objectives is explained by Corentin Cohen, who says that “networks of individuals working together for solidarity, economic or political objectives became categorized as organized crime or as a mafia.”
During an investigation into the pressing cyber threat in Africa, Rory Corcoran, acting head of Interpol’s new Financial Crime and Anti-Corruption Centre, said, “We are dealing with a highly organized international network. These guys are not opportunists… We’re mapping them out around the world.”
Court documents allege that Black Axe maintains a pyramidal command structure with zones worldwide, with the worldwide headquarters based in Benin City in Nigeria. Although the headquarters are based in Nigeria, the organization is not localized, contradicting the existing research of a “mafia” organization.
Criminal Mobility of Black Axe Members
Initially, it appears as though Black Axe demonstrates a unique convergence of both the importation/deprivation model of criminal mobility (as members are “pushed” out of a volatile home country in search of a better life) and the strategic, rational, and highly mobile theory of criminal mobility as the organization overlaps with the NBM and recruitment process is fairly strict, reflecting that of a confraternity.
A closer assessment of the group’s global expansion, strategic use of South Africa, and connection with the NBM suggest that Black Axe is predominantly a highly mobile and strategic organization with an operational base in Nigeria and territorial “zones” worldwide. The specific criminal activity and control methods differ depending on the environment of these territories, suggesting that these “zone” leaders have some authority to orchestrate actions and make international connections to thrive in the specific environment.
Limitations in the analysis
There are limitations in this analysis, with the following being the most significant.
- The overlap with the NBM makes it difficult to identify Black Axe members in leadership who buffer themselves from criminal activity.
- Sensationalized headlines mislead the reality of the group’s progression from dealing drugs to romance scams in South Africa, such as the BBC’s headline The ultra-violent cult that became a global mafia.
- The secrecy surrounding the Black Axe confraternity cult’s origins and methods makes it difficult to investigate true motives, recruitment methods, and strategies for expansion.
- Using the example of Italy and South Africa, Black Axe, it is obvious that different primary crimes and methods in various regions make it difficult to assess the criminal organization as a whole.
- Alikening Black Axe and the “Nigerian Mafia” to the Italian mafia introduces misconceptions about the organization, including their origins and methods.
References
- Becucci, S. (2022). Nigerian criminal groups in Italy: Organizational structure, drug trafficking and sexual exploitation. Quaderni Di Sociologia, (88–XLVI), 71–91. https://doi.org/10.4000/qds.4839
- Bernardo, C. (2017). Migration of the Nigerian mafia. University of Cape Town News. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2017-05-16-migration-of-the-nigerian-mafia.
- Burke, J. (2022). Gangs of cybercriminals expanding across Africa, investigators say. The Guardian. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/nov/27/gangs-of-cybercriminals-are-expanding-across-africa-investigators-say.
- Campana, P. (2011). Eavesdropping on the Mob: The Functional Diversification of Mafia Activities across Territories, European Journal of Criminology, 8(3), 213–228.
- Cohen, C. (2022). The “Nigerian mafia” feedback loop: European police, global media, and Nigerian civil society. Trends Organ Crim. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-022-09471-0
- Daily Trust. (December 29, 2021). Neo-Black Movement dissociates itself from cult group, Black Axe. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://dailytrust.com/neo-black-movement-dissociates-self-from-cult-group-black-axe/
- Dolley, C. (2022). Clash of the cartels: Unmasking the global drug kingpins stalking South Africa. Maverick 451. Evans, J. (2023). Alleged ‘Black Axe’ scammers challenging extradition to US. News 24. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/alleged-black-axe-scammers-challenging-extradition-to-us-20230607
- Hassan, T. (2022). Nigeria: Events of 2022. Human Rights Watch. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/nigeria.
- Hyman, A. (2021). Nigerian mafia leaders arrested after Hawks swoop in Cape Town. Times Live. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-10-19-nigerian-mafia-leaders-arrested-as-sa-and-us-forces-swoop-in-cape-town/.
- Interpol. (2022). Financial crime: South African fraud gang dismantled. Interpol News and Events. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2022/Financial-crime-South-African-fraud-gang-dismantled.
- Mail & Guardian. (2002). Nigerians dominate cocaine trade in SA. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://mg.co.za/article/2002-05-08-nigerians-dominate-cocaine-trade-in-sa/.
- Northcott, C., Judah, S., & Macjob, P. (2021). The ultra-violent cult that became a global mafia. BBC. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59614595
- Nwakuonr, G.A. & Nwanne, C. (2018). Why South Africans attack Nigerians. The Guardian. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://guardian.ng/features/why-south-africans-attack-nigerians/.
- SAFLII. (September, 2022). Osagiede and Others v S (A95/22) [2022] ZAWCHC 166; [2022] 4 All SA 845 (WCC). Accessed on September 17, 2023, from http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2022/166.html.
- United States of America v. Osagiede, 2021R00423/JLH/W. (United States District Court of New Jersey). Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.justice.gov/d9/press-releases/attachments/2021/10/20/osagiedeetal.indictment_0.pdf.
Dan Bloom wrote an article for Daily Mail, introducing creative and innovative ways of trafficking drugs across borders and describing operations orchestrated by relatively small and loosely structured organizations.
These efforts, such as filling empty beer cans with narcotics and surgically implanting drugs in pet labradors, demonstrate the ever-evolving methods and techniques used by drug traffickers to move illegal substances across borders.
Smuggling and Operational Methods
The smuggling and operational methods mentioned in Dan Bloom’s article can be grouped as follows:
- Commercial air courier operations, such as someone using a skull-shaped packet of cocaine under a black wig while flying
- Couriers using other modes of transport, such as smuggling marijuana on a surfboard across the US-Mexico border
- Hiding drugs among unaccompanied legitimate commerce, such as traffickers filling furniture with more than five tonnes of cannabis, worth £12 million, through a port on the coast of England (the details of the drugs being unaccompanied among legitimate cargo are assumed from the article but not confirmed)
Calculated Chance of Success
Of the above, efforts where narcotics have been hidden in existing cargo present a rational and calculated chance of success. Hiding large volumes of contraband in unaccompanied, legitimate cargo presents an important smuggling strategy.
The necessary manpower is limited to supplying and receiving the narcotics, not the actual transition. As long as a connection with or access to a legitimate cargo company is established, large volumes of drugs can be trafficked via port entry without necessarily making the commercial shipper complicit in the scheme, reducing the risk of arrest and the number of players involved.
The Risk of Couriers
Most of the efforts mentioned in Dan Bloom’s article are carried out by couriers who have failed (without suggesting previous successes using the same method). The argument that using a courier is high risk aligns with Caulkins et al.’s paper that explores how illegal drugs enter the United Kingdom. The paper reveals that most interviewees acted as couriers and were caught on their first attempt at trafficking drugs, with the arrest risk being considerable, especially for novices (implying that there is a skill to master and succeed as a courier). Costs include the fee-for-service arrangement, the travel ticket, the cost of the drugs (limited to what a single person can carry or transport), and the high risk of a snitch.
Overall, using a courier is a small-time operation with high risk and moderate reward. Assessing the situation further, the existence of X-rays that can identify ingested narcotics and sniffer dogs that can smell a range of drugs at major airports increases the risk of discovery among commercial air couriers. Land and port border control also use scanning technology, but as reported by Bernstein in NBC Montana, CBP currently scans only 2% of all private passenger vehicles and 16% of commercial vehicles at land borders, suggesting that the risk of detection is fairly low compared to commercial air options.
Additional operational Methods
One operational method not mentioned in Bloom’s article is using corrupt truck drivers to smuggle drugs across borders, arguably the most lucrative method with the lowest risk of being captured. Caulkins et al. describe how truck driver operations span several years without being caught, move large volumes of illicit cargo, and involve smaller groups of minor players to split profits.
Perhaps the fact that none of these “corrupt vehicle operator” efforts are mentioned in Bloom’s article is a testament to the success of the method, or perhaps the lack of this operational method on the list suggests that it is not creative enough to be featured. Regardless, this operational method offers relatively low barriers to entry with a high chance of success, making it a viable option for rationally-acting smuggling operations.
References
- Bernstein, L. (2019). Vehicle scanning technology at the border is about to ruin the drug trade. NBC Montana. Accessed on September 10, 2023, from https://nbcmontana.com/news/nation-world/vehicle-scanning-technology-at-the-border-is-about-to-ruin-the-drug-trade
- Bloom, D. (2009). Busted! Ingenious (but failed) attempts by the world's drug dealers to outsmart customs using fake nappies, surfboards, and bottles of Champagne. Mail Online. Accessed on September 10, 2023, from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2711652/Busted-Ingenious-failed-attempts-world-s-drug-dealers-outsmart-customs-using-fake-nappies-surfboards-bottles-Champagne.html
- Caulkins, J.P., Burnett, H., & Leslie, E. (2009). How illegal drugs enter an island country: Insights from interviews with incarcerated smugglers. Global Crime 10(1&2), 66-93
Research reveals a number of possible existential motivations for engaging in terrorism. Are these research findings important for understanding international terrorism, or are they unreliable?
When aligning with the positivist school of criminology, which considers internal or external influences on individuals as the primary cause of criminal behavior, it would be short-sighted to ignore the existential factors that motivate international terrorists.
Existential motivations
Cottee & Hayward explore three existential motivations for engaging in terrorism, namely the desire for excitement, the desire for ultimate meaning, and the desire for glory.
The authors also describe the goal of terrorism as two-fold: pursuing the political goals of small groups and exploring the site of individual self-drama and self-reinvention.
Researching existential motivation demands a qualitative approach to research, which is used to find meanings, feelings, and underlying opinions, therefore playing an essential role in understanding why individuals engage in international terrorism.
Cottee & Hayward did a convincing job to shed light on the motivations for engaging in international terrorism and how to manage the threat by exploring how terrorist agents feel and the emotional complexity of terrorism. However, other efforts are necessary for a more holistic understanding of the phenomenon.
Social network Theory
Bruinsma & Bernasco discuss the social network theory in line with other transnational crimes, describing social collaboration and organization in light of financial and legal risks. International terrorism suggests that the rewards are more “existential,” which introduces difficulty in applying the social network theory (which is focused on social organizations surrounding financial and legal risks).
Even so, international terrorist groups seem to consist of close-knit, cohesive, and ethically homogenous groups of people with shared spiritual or political beliefs, likening them to Bruinsma & Bernasco’s description of smuggling and large-scale heroin trading groups.
rational choice theory
Perry & Hasisi move away from the positivist school of criminology and discuss rational choice theory to review the religious, personal, and social incentives demonstrated by those who kill themselves in suicide attacks.
They argue that suicide bombers (in particular) are driven by the anticipation of costs and benefits, and they are committed to maximizing self-gratifying, beneficial behavior.
connecting the dots
Reviewing both theories closely, it’s possible to draw parallels between positivist and classical approaches and determine the overlaps in religious motivation and the desire to elevate the self. Both require a focus on mentality and empirical research, which ‘reads between the lines’ of quantitative research to understand social phenomena better.
Outside of the terrorist agent, modern developments also play a significant role in the increase in international terrorism, such as improved communication technologies, deregulated financial markets, and increased flow of people and products across borders.
All of these external factors should be considered in conjunction with internal and existential factors to gain a better understanding of the rise of international terrorism. As a unique transnational crime that includes a strong political agenda instead of a financial one, international terrorism demands a closer look at the existential motives, making Cottee & Hayward’s reading valuable.
References
- Bruinsma, G. & Bernasco, W. (2004). Criminal Groups and Transnational Illegal Markets: Examination on the Basis of Social Network Theory, Crime, Law & Social Change 41: 79–94.
- Cottee, S. and Hayward, K. (2011). Terrorist (e)motives: The existential attractions of terrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34, 963–986.
- Perry, & Hasisi, B. (2015). Rational Choice Rewards and the Jihadist Suicide Bomber. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(1), 53–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.962991
- LibreTexts. (July 17, 2023). Globalization and Transnational Crime in Human Security in World Affairs - Problems and Opportunities 2e. Accessed on September 03, 2023
- UNODC. (2018). Module 1: Introduction to International Terrorism in Education for Justice University Module Series: Counter-Terrorism. Accessed on September 03, 2023
Do you believe that the ICC could serve as a deterrent to international terrorism?
Given the International Criminal Court (ICC)'s current resource situation and the existing understanding of terrorism, I do not believe that the ICC could serve as an effective deterrent to international terrorism.
What is Terrorism?
There are various definitions of terrorism, yet no universally accepted definition exists. This makes it incredibly difficult to prosecute and fight terrorism, presenting an obstacle to global counter-terrorism efforts.
Instead, different nations understand terrorism as it is explained in various conventions and treaties, as well as independent scholars.
The most basic definition addresses three distinct elements.
- Violence
- Non-state actor
- Political purpose
Terrorism is, therefore, the unlawful threat or act of violence committed for a political purpose by a non-state actor.
Both the UN General Assembly and the Security Council have repeatedly condemned international terrorism as "one of the most serious threats to international peace and security."
Why Will the ICC Not Deter International Terrorism?
While some argue that the ICC may effectively deter international terrorism, the following reasons suggest otherwise.
Lack of Definition
First, there is no universally-agreed definition of terrorism which makes it difficult (and near impossible) for the ICC (or any international court or tribunal) to prosecute terrorism as a crime (Wertheim, 2003).
In addition, scholars debate whether international terrorism is a criminal act, thus implicating human rights law, or whether it surpasses the threshold for the violence of armed conflict and should be treated under humanitarian law (UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020).
Possibility of a Political Offence
Second, without a clear definition, certain acts broadly understood as terrorism could be argued as “political offenses” to avoid consequences for terrorist actions. On the opposite end of concerns, it allows alleged offenders to be punished for their political convictions or affiliations rather than alleged behavior (Wertheim, 2003).
With this in mind, introducing terrorism to the ICC jurisdiction makes it difficult to balance fundamental human rights with justice and muddies the waters of the ICC’s safeguards against political charges.
Lack of Resources
Third, the ICC has previously rejected the suggestion that drug trafficking and terrorism be included in its jurisdiction due to its lack of resources which makes it difficult to tackle such a complex crime (Wertheim, 2003). This situation has not changed, and the likelihood of the ICC deterring future terrorists through swift and severe punishment is not an effective reality.
Deterrence and Terrorism
Finally, and perhaps most notable, is that deterrence efforts do not sway the motivation for terrorist acts. When applying the rational choice theory to suicide terrorists, Perry explores a thorough cost-benefit analysis that concludes death offers significant rewards.
The possibility of punishment does not outweigh the benefit of martyrdom, which comes with religious, personal, and social rewards (2015).
What is the Solution to Terrorism?
After addressing the above concerns, there’s a possibility that the ICC could prosecute terrorists and find justice for their crimes. However, I don’t think that the ICC could deter international terrorism. So, what is to be done?
Consider Agnew’s General strain theory which suggests sub-state terrorism is most likely to occur when people experience collective strains that are high in magnitude and affecting civilians, unjust, and inflicted by significantly more powerful “others” (2010). Applying this thought process to international terrorism, it’s possible to deter terrorism by reducing these strains and considering intervening mechanisms between collective strains and crime (Agnew, 2010).
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Burkina Faso, and Syria are the top five countries with the highest terrorism index in 2021. Consider what these countries have in common — what are the strains, and how can the international community help alleviate these strains?
Another option would be prosecuting select international terrorists under one of the other ICC jurisdictions, such as crimes against humanity. But while this demonstrates an attempt at finding justice, I do not believe it will deter future terrorists.
References
- Agnew, R. (2010). A general strain theory of terrorism. Theoretical Criminology, 14(2), 131-153.
- Perry, S., & Hasisi, B. (2015). Rational choice rewards and the jihadist suicide bomber. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(1), 53-80.
- UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2020, November 13). E4J Global Podcast Series - Episode 6: Counter-Terrorism, Int'l Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. [Video] Youtube. https://youtu.be/J7N59VqwEIQ
- Vision of Humanity. (2022, October 21) Global terrorism index: Countries most impacted by terrorism. Retrieved March 12, 2023, from https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/
- Wertheim, P. J. (2003). Should “Grave Crimes of International Terrorism” be included in the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court? Policy and Society, 22(2), 1-21.
Why do you believe the United States has decided against submitting to the international criminal court’s jurisdiction?
What is the International Criminal Court?
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an intergovernmental organization and international tribunal that “investigates and, where warranted, tries individuals charged with the gravest crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression.”
What Is the Purpose of the ICC?
While the ICC is not without its shortcomings, it introduces global accountability and strives to achieve justice for victims in situations where domestic courts cannot do so.
The ICC strives to uphold the promise of universal justice by investigating, prosecuting, and trying individuals accused of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community on condition that the crime(s) occurred after the Rome Statute took effect in 2002.
The ICC and the United States
Not only has the United States decided against submitting to the International Criminal Court (ICC), but national leaders have vocally opposed the ICC. Perhaps the most poignant reason is the perceived threat the ICC presents to the state's sovereignty (BBC News, 2018), as the ICC asserts itself when a state refuses (or fails) to use the domestic criminal justice system to bring justice to the perpetrator(s) of egregious crimes.
There is also the concern of the US military becoming vulnerable to prosecution for war crimes worldwide, possibly as the target of politically-motivated attacks (Krcmaric, 2022). The effectiveness, efficiency, and reliability of the ICC have also been the topic of criticism, often without considering the significant challenges that the ICC faces, which includes a difficult relationship with the world’s great powers, such as the United States and Russia.
I disagree with the United States’ decision, which can be considered short-sighted and aggressive. For example, the United States has threatened tough action against the ICC if it attempts to prosecute Americans for alleged war crimes in Afghanistan (BBC News, 2018).
In another example, Donald Trump’s attack on the ICC highlighted his contempt for the global rule of law (Evenson, 2020). As a former powerful leader, this sends a very dangerous message.
The United State’s disregard for the ICC does not appear to focus on the alleged lack of efficiency or results but on self-preservation. This siloed approach to global justice is concerning and seemingly unfounded, especially considering that the ICC is a last resort for crimes that can not (or will not) be addressed in domestic courts.
The Need for State Collaboration
Without a police force or army, the ICC relies on state cooperation to detain alleged perpetrators. Essentially, this means that the United States still has control over managing criminal allegations before it is presented to the ICC unless an extradition treaty muddies the waters (IntlCriminalCourt, 2021).
Legally, the ICC’s jurisdiction limits its power. The intergovernmental organization does not develop new international law but only seeks to consolidate established rules of customary international law that cover crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Schloenhardt, 2005).
The ICC process involves lengthy and thorough investigations. When an alleged perpetrator is summoned, there is surmountable evidence and a strong belief that they have committed a crime that shocks the conscience of humanity (IntlCriminalCourt, 2021). If finding justice for egregious crimes is considered a threat, then it suggests something sinister at play. As Schoenhardt continues to point out, countries are quicker to put their sovereignty ahead of criminal justice (2005).
Even with the processes mentioned above and safeguards, it’s not uncommon for powerful international and intergovernmental organizations to be accused of threatening a state's sovereignty. For example, legal scholars tend to view Interpol’s increasing cooperation in police matters as an assault on the sovereignty of states (Calcara, 2021). Unfortunately, the misuse and abuse of tools and processes is an unavoidable risk to global cooperation — but what is the alternative aside from improved accountability?
A Step Toward Global Justice?
Collaboration and solutions are key to managing global problems, and trust and accountability are needed to ensure smooth processes. The ICC is tackling a mammoth task, and there are bound to be teething issues along the way.
However, systems of accountability and fairness are incorporated within the organization. Consider Ohansen’s description of the ICC’s use of its direct, physical power with the Detention Center, which prioritizes different channels for accessibility, participation, and neutrality (2020). The United States’ aggressive opposition to the ICC appears to be founded in an attempt to avoid responsibility for alleged war crimes and hold onto power when it best suits them.
References
- BBC News. (2018, October 3). Why is the International Criminal Court under attack? - BBC News. [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/CxfHYjg6MOU
- Calcara, G. (2021). Balancing International Police Cooperation: INTERPOL and the Undesirable Trade-off Between Rights of Individuals and Global Security. Liverpool Law Review, 42(2), 111-142.
- Evenson, E. (2020, October 28). Donald Trump's attack on the ICC shows his contempt for the global rule of law. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved March 5, 2023, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/06/donald-trumps-attack-icc-shows-his-contempt-global-rule-law
- IntlCriminalCourt. (2021, January 27). The ICC Process. [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/ydtgSB9jROw.
- Krcmaric, D. (2022, May 16). Does the International Criminal Court target the American military?: American Political Science Review. Cambridge Core. Retrieved March 5, 2023, from https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/does-the-international-criminal-court-target-the-american-military/C05172E34444A01BFEC7BD09436D2B9D
- Ohansen, S. (2020). Case Study: The ICC Detention Centre. In The Human Rights Accountability Mechanisms of International Organizations (pp. 232-284). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schloenhardt, A. (2005). Transnational organized crime and the International Criminal Court developments and debates. University of Queensland Law Journal, 24(1), 93-122.