Prisons are likely to become more – rather than less – significant centers of gravity for the jihadist movement. We discuss some ways in which prisons matter during the radicalization process.
Scholars suggest that an individual’s criminal past impacts possible terrorist futures for the jihadist movement. In particular, Basra et al.’s research has emerged four main themes.
Radicalization and recruitment
The redemption narrative offers a radical change of values and behavior while encouraging a guilt-free sense of rebellion and anti-establishment. Crime is justified on religious grounds, whether or not the recruit has a religious background or understanding of Islam. In this instance, recruitment can be viewed as an unintended merging of criminal and jihadist narratives.
Prisons as a milieu
Prisons expose vulnerabilities in individuals susceptible to “cognitive openings” and the willingness to identify with new beliefs. Networking opportunities in prison lay the groundwork for radicalization, with rapid mobilization and solidification of radical beliefs occurring post-release.
Skills transfers
Jihadists also take advantage of criminal skills in prison, such as connections to gangs and weapons, and the soft skill of staying under the radar by using fake documents and safe houses. Familiarity with violence is also considered a skill transfer, as recruits with violent pasts are less likely to be psychologically hesitant to commit violent terrorist acts.
Criminal financing
Petty crime and criminal operations are known to finance terrorists, particularly their return to Syria. There has been a shift in terrorist financing from state-funded to micro-level self-funded methods (through criminal efforts). Jihadists also leverage the criminal financial strategy of encouraging a low barrier to entry, sharing their ideology to justify their crimes, and encouraging continued criminal behavior by simply shifting the purpose to meet jihadist ideals.
Institutional Responses
These findings challenge traditional views of radicalization and significantly impact counter-terrorism responses, forcing authorities to consider prisons a breeding ground for radicalization where, previously, foreign fighters were recruited from universities and places of religious worship.
Again, the criminal challenges of society (which now include terrorism) come back to addressing societal needs and effective rehabilitation efforts to impact change. Exploring this demands an entirely new discussion, but essentially, incorporating rehabilitation and post-release services as a priority in prisons rather than punitive measures could protect the vulnerable isolation of offenders and reduce recidivism (in the form of terrorist action).
There are several examples of jihadists who have emerged from the criminal-terrorist nexus in prison and caused severe damage. The case of Omar el-Hussein demonstrates both arguments — that prisons are a location for radicalization and that offenders are vulnerable people whose rehabilitation and reintegration are largely neglected.
El-Hussein was radicalized in prison and even red-flagged by authorities. After his release, a technicality prevented him from accessing probation services, leading him to be homeless and jobless, during which rapid radicalization occurred. Destitute and radicalized, he carried out the deadly shootings at a cultural center and a synagogue in Copenhagen in February 2015.
References
- Basra, R., Neumann, P., and Brunner, C. (2016). Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus. London: CSR.
- Burchett, J. & Weyembergh, A. (2023). Prison and detention conditions in the EU. IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs. Accessed on September 23, 2023, from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/741374/IPOL_STU(2023)741374_EN.pdf
- Clarke, C. (2016). Drugs and Thugs: Funding Terrorism through Narcotics Trafficking. Journal of Strategic Security, 9(3).
- Mikkelsen, R. (2007). U.S. prison system a costly and harmful failure: report. Reuters. Accessed on September 23, 2023, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-prisons-idUSN1841666120071119
- UNODC. (2017). Roadmap for the development of prison-based rehabilitation programs. Criminal Justice Handbook Series. Accessed on September 23, 2023, from https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/17-05452_ebook.pdf
As borders have become more porous, criminal mobility has become more accessible, contributing to transnational crime. Let’s assess the push and pull factors contributing to Nigeria’s Black Axe migration to South Africa.
Introduction to black axe
The Neo-Black Movement (NBM) began as a confraternity in Nigeria, Benin City. The group was established at the University of Benin during the 1970s as a student self-help association but gradually transformed into a criminal group in response to the political dictatorship in Nigeria, acting as a violent weapon to be used by political parties against the opposition.
The criminal splinter group became known as Black Axe and has since earned a notorious reputation for violence, murder, cult-like behavior, and transnational crime. While the legally-operating NBM has disassociated itself with Black Axe, many publications and research efforts still group the two organizations together. This analysis of their criminal mobility uses news articles, academic journals, and court documents to conclude that Black Axe began as an emergent criminal group due to political turmoil but has since developed to become a strategic, international organization. Headquartered in Nigeria, Black Axe “zones” are highly flexible, connected, and fluid, able to spread worldwide due to their flexibility and internal social bonds.
While most online literature focuses on Black Axe's presence in Italy, where they have been dubbed the “Nigerian Mafia,” I have selected to analyze their presence in South Africa due to my personal experience of witnessing Nigerian criminal organizations in action and my understanding of the South African landscape.
It is important to note that Black Axe's presence in Italy is strong, where criminal activity and methods differ greatly from that in South Africa — a discussion and analysis on its own.
General Impression of the Global Dimension of the Group
Since the 1980s, Nigerian organized crime has migrated worldwide, developing a strong presence in Italy and South Africa. Today, Black Axe operates across Africa and Europe, and they also target the United States of America via the Internet.
Push factors prompting migration of Black Axe
Initially, the international migration of Nigerian criminal groups developed due to a combination of three factors: the surge of wealth and accompanying corruption due to the discovery of oil in the 1950s, the second economic depression in the 1980s, and widespread corruption that led to mass migration.
South African pull factors
Due to pull factors, Black Axe and other Nigerian criminal organizations were established in South Africa, a fragile state with a high corruption and gang violence rate, making it an ideal location for facilitating various transnational criminal transactions.
Earlier reports of Black Axe operations in South Africa refer to drug trafficking crimes, where Axemen established strategic, operational bases near target clientele, such as brothels, and took advantage of South Africa’s post-apartheid political and social transition to succeed. Groups sometimes overtook entire neighborhoods, such as Hillbrow in Johannesburg.
Over time, the group adapted to flourish in cybercrimes such as internet fraud, romance scams, and money laundering to target international markets and leverage legal knowledge to avoid extradition and capture. South Africa has also served as a strategic springboard for Black Axe members to access more lucrative countries, such as Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. However, this does not necessarily describe transplantation, as the criminal operations and methods differ from one location to another.
South African PUSH factors
It is important to note that the racial tension and inequality in South Africa have the potential to develop into a push factor, encouraging Nigerian criminal organizations to move (or perhaps adapt their criminal behavior) as xenophobia creates a hostile environment. Nigerian gangs (and non-criminal Nigerians) have been the victims of violent attacks, facing extortion and death.
Black Axe networks
Despite Nigeria’s consistency as a politically and economically unstable country, Black Axe remains headquartered in Benin City and operates in regional areas called “zones.” The development of trusted networks with shared criminal objectives is explained by Corentin Cohen, who says that “networks of individuals working together for solidarity, economic or political objectives became categorized as organized crime or as a mafia.”
During an investigation into the pressing cyber threat in Africa, Rory Corcoran, acting head of Interpol’s new Financial Crime and Anti-Corruption Centre, said, “We are dealing with a highly organized international network. These guys are not opportunists… We’re mapping them out around the world.”
Court documents allege that Black Axe maintains a pyramidal command structure with zones worldwide, with the worldwide headquarters based in Benin City in Nigeria. Although the headquarters are based in Nigeria, the organization is not localized, contradicting the existing research of a “mafia” organization.
Criminal Mobility of Black Axe Members
Initially, it appears as though Black Axe demonstrates a unique convergence of both the importation/deprivation model of criminal mobility (as members are “pushed” out of a volatile home country in search of a better life) and the strategic, rational, and highly mobile theory of criminal mobility as the organization overlaps with the NBM and recruitment process is fairly strict, reflecting that of a confraternity.
A closer assessment of the group’s global expansion, strategic use of South Africa, and connection with the NBM suggest that Black Axe is predominantly a highly mobile and strategic organization with an operational base in Nigeria and territorial “zones” worldwide. The specific criminal activity and control methods differ depending on the environment of these territories, suggesting that these “zone” leaders have some authority to orchestrate actions and make international connections to thrive in the specific environment.
Limitations in the analysis
There are limitations in this analysis, with the following being the most significant.
- The overlap with the NBM makes it difficult to identify Black Axe members in leadership who buffer themselves from criminal activity.
- Sensationalized headlines mislead the reality of the group’s progression from dealing drugs to romance scams in South Africa, such as the BBC’s headline The ultra-violent cult that became a global mafia.
- The secrecy surrounding the Black Axe confraternity cult’s origins and methods makes it difficult to investigate true motives, recruitment methods, and strategies for expansion.
- Using the example of Italy and South Africa, Black Axe, it is obvious that different primary crimes and methods in various regions make it difficult to assess the criminal organization as a whole.
- Alikening Black Axe and the “Nigerian Mafia” to the Italian mafia introduces misconceptions about the organization, including their origins and methods.
References
- Becucci, S. (2022). Nigerian criminal groups in Italy: Organizational structure, drug trafficking and sexual exploitation. Quaderni Di Sociologia, (88–XLVI), 71–91. https://doi.org/10.4000/qds.4839
- Bernardo, C. (2017). Migration of the Nigerian mafia. University of Cape Town News. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2017-05-16-migration-of-the-nigerian-mafia.
- Burke, J. (2022). Gangs of cybercriminals expanding across Africa, investigators say. The Guardian. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/nov/27/gangs-of-cybercriminals-are-expanding-across-africa-investigators-say.
- Campana, P. (2011). Eavesdropping on the Mob: The Functional Diversification of Mafia Activities across Territories, European Journal of Criminology, 8(3), 213–228.
- Cohen, C. (2022). The “Nigerian mafia” feedback loop: European police, global media, and Nigerian civil society. Trends Organ Crim. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-022-09471-0
- Daily Trust. (December 29, 2021). Neo-Black Movement dissociates itself from cult group, Black Axe. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://dailytrust.com/neo-black-movement-dissociates-self-from-cult-group-black-axe/
- Dolley, C. (2022). Clash of the cartels: Unmasking the global drug kingpins stalking South Africa. Maverick 451. Evans, J. (2023). Alleged ‘Black Axe’ scammers challenging extradition to US. News 24. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/alleged-black-axe-scammers-challenging-extradition-to-us-20230607
- Hassan, T. (2022). Nigeria: Events of 2022. Human Rights Watch. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/nigeria.
- Hyman, A. (2021). Nigerian mafia leaders arrested after Hawks swoop in Cape Town. Times Live. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-10-19-nigerian-mafia-leaders-arrested-as-sa-and-us-forces-swoop-in-cape-town/.
- Interpol. (2022). Financial crime: South African fraud gang dismantled. Interpol News and Events. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2022/Financial-crime-South-African-fraud-gang-dismantled.
- Mail & Guardian. (2002). Nigerians dominate cocaine trade in SA. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://mg.co.za/article/2002-05-08-nigerians-dominate-cocaine-trade-in-sa/.
- Northcott, C., Judah, S., & Macjob, P. (2021). The ultra-violent cult that became a global mafia. BBC. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59614595
- Nwakuonr, G.A. & Nwanne, C. (2018). Why South Africans attack Nigerians. The Guardian. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://guardian.ng/features/why-south-africans-attack-nigerians/.
- SAFLII. (September, 2022). Osagiede and Others v S (A95/22) [2022] ZAWCHC 166; [2022] 4 All SA 845 (WCC). Accessed on September 17, 2023, from http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2022/166.html.
- United States of America v. Osagiede, 2021R00423/JLH/W. (United States District Court of New Jersey). Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.justice.gov/d9/press-releases/attachments/2021/10/20/osagiedeetal.indictment_0.pdf.
Dan Bloom wrote an article for Daily Mail, introducing creative and innovative ways of trafficking drugs across borders and describing operations orchestrated by relatively small and loosely structured organizations.
These efforts, such as filling empty beer cans with narcotics and surgically implanting drugs in pet labradors, demonstrate the ever-evolving methods and techniques used by drug traffickers to move illegal substances across borders.
Smuggling and Operational Methods
The smuggling and operational methods mentioned in Dan Bloom’s article can be grouped as follows:
- Commercial air courier operations, such as someone using a skull-shaped packet of cocaine under a black wig while flying
- Couriers using other modes of transport, such as smuggling marijuana on a surfboard across the US-Mexico border
- Hiding drugs among unaccompanied legitimate commerce, such as traffickers filling furniture with more than five tonnes of cannabis, worth £12 million, through a port on the coast of England (the details of the drugs being unaccompanied among legitimate cargo are assumed from the article but not confirmed)
Calculated Chance of Success
Of the above, efforts where narcotics have been hidden in existing cargo present a rational and calculated chance of success. Hiding large volumes of contraband in unaccompanied, legitimate cargo presents an important smuggling strategy.
The necessary manpower is limited to supplying and receiving the narcotics, not the actual transition. As long as a connection with or access to a legitimate cargo company is established, large volumes of drugs can be trafficked via port entry without necessarily making the commercial shipper complicit in the scheme, reducing the risk of arrest and the number of players involved.
The Risk of Couriers
Most of the efforts mentioned in Dan Bloom’s article are carried out by couriers who have failed (without suggesting previous successes using the same method). The argument that using a courier is high risk aligns with Caulkins et al.’s paper that explores how illegal drugs enter the United Kingdom. The paper reveals that most interviewees acted as couriers and were caught on their first attempt at trafficking drugs, with the arrest risk being considerable, especially for novices (implying that there is a skill to master and succeed as a courier). Costs include the fee-for-service arrangement, the travel ticket, the cost of the drugs (limited to what a single person can carry or transport), and the high risk of a snitch.
Overall, using a courier is a small-time operation with high risk and moderate reward. Assessing the situation further, the existence of X-rays that can identify ingested narcotics and sniffer dogs that can smell a range of drugs at major airports increases the risk of discovery among commercial air couriers. Land and port border control also use scanning technology, but as reported by Bernstein in NBC Montana, CBP currently scans only 2% of all private passenger vehicles and 16% of commercial vehicles at land borders, suggesting that the risk of detection is fairly low compared to commercial air options.
Additional operational Methods
One operational method not mentioned in Bloom’s article is using corrupt truck drivers to smuggle drugs across borders, arguably the most lucrative method with the lowest risk of being captured. Caulkins et al. describe how truck driver operations span several years without being caught, move large volumes of illicit cargo, and involve smaller groups of minor players to split profits.
Perhaps the fact that none of these “corrupt vehicle operator” efforts are mentioned in Bloom’s article is a testament to the success of the method, or perhaps the lack of this operational method on the list suggests that it is not creative enough to be featured. Regardless, this operational method offers relatively low barriers to entry with a high chance of success, making it a viable option for rationally-acting smuggling operations.
References
- Bernstein, L. (2019). Vehicle scanning technology at the border is about to ruin the drug trade. NBC Montana. Accessed on September 10, 2023, from https://nbcmontana.com/news/nation-world/vehicle-scanning-technology-at-the-border-is-about-to-ruin-the-drug-trade
- Bloom, D. (2009). Busted! Ingenious (but failed) attempts by the world's drug dealers to outsmart customs using fake nappies, surfboards, and bottles of Champagne. Mail Online. Accessed on September 10, 2023, from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2711652/Busted-Ingenious-failed-attempts-world-s-drug-dealers-outsmart-customs-using-fake-nappies-surfboards-bottles-Champagne.html
- Caulkins, J.P., Burnett, H., & Leslie, E. (2009). How illegal drugs enter an island country: Insights from interviews with incarcerated smugglers. Global Crime 10(1&2), 66-93
The ambiguity of numbers and statistics has the potential for misleading interpretations, as is evident in the case of seizing and interdicting drugs at and beyond U.S. borders. Why is measuring interdiction “success” politically tricky?
Not only are drug seizure figures used as evidence for policy success, but they remain largely unchallenged while serving multiple interests (and functions) for different state departments.
mythical numbers
Peter Andreas explores how “mythical numbers” occur due to various reasons. For example, he mentions that some numbers are noticeably missing, some are recycled through the media without accountability, and unimpressive numbers are suppressed. These issues, and more, present interdiction success as “decorations” for the policy process.
Essentially, these issues boil down to the lack of accountability for the purity of the figures and their source, an issue that is aggravated by different government agencies competing against one another for budget allocation and politicians attempting to prove policy success.
US border as a political battleground
Using the US border as a battleground between Democrats and Republicans is a tale as old as time, with Republicans attempting to control illicit drug flow and immigration as a priority to advance their agenda.
Operation intercept
Consider President Nixon’s Operation Intercept, an anti-drug measure that resulted in a near shutdown of border crossings between Mexico and the United States in 1969, a significant effort in his campaign. The practice of using misleading numbers is still prevalent today.
Justin Reid describes Operation Intercept as “an exercise in international extortion” where journalists reported questionable statistics provided by the government to promote (and question) Nixon’s upcoming war on drugs, which followed two years later.
Operation Lone Star
The practice of using misleading numbers is still prevalent today. The Marshall Project published an article demonstrating how political leaders amplify specific figures and shift metrics to further their campaign and policy agenda. An investigation of Operation Lone Star reveals how Texas Governor Greg Abbott skewed data to describe a multi-billion dollar border operation as successful in an effort to get re-elected.
An investigation by ProPublica, The Texas Tribune, and The Marshall Project found, “The state’s claim of success has been based on shifting metrics that included crimes with no connection to the border, work conducted by troopers stationed in targeted counties prior to the operation, and arrest and drug seizure efforts that do not clearly distinguish DPS’s role from that of other agencies.” The article is quite in-depth and dives into specific details of Operation Lone Star and how the figures were used as weapons in the fight to support Governor Abbott’s policy goal of securing the border (and getting reelected).
Policy, Numbers and Transnational Crime
This commentary would only be complete by mentioning that policy is challenging to measure with complete transparency, attention to specific (relevant) indicators, and accountability. In the illicit flow of goods, money, and people, where gathering and measuring data is even more challenging, attention to reliability and validity is very important. Using the US border as an example, it's apparent how policy and the reaction to transnational crime has an impact on the US criminal justice system (and global efforts to target cross-border crimes).
References
- Arsovska, J. (2011). Conceptualizing and studying organized crime in a global context. In C. Smith, S. Zhang, R. Barberet, Routledge Handbook of International Criminology. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Andreas, P. (2010). The Politics of Measuring Illicit Flows and Policy Effectiveness - Alternative Formats In: P Andreas, KM Greenhill (eds.), Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict (pp. 23-45). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
- Reid, J. M. (2022). “An exercise in international extortion”: Operation “Intercept” and Nixon’s 1969 war on drugs (Order No. 29995846). Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. (2742630076). Retrieved from https://ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/exercise-international-extortion-operation/docview/2742630076/se-2
Nigeria has several criminal organizations that conduct various illicit activities, including human trafficking, smuggling, drug trafficking, and cybercrime (Anisulowo, 2022). In the past decade, the Black Axe has become one of the most powerful and deadly criminal groups originating from Nigeria, with a presence throughout Africa, Europe, Asia, and North America (Judah et al., 2021).
The global nature of Black Axe has led to different understandings of the group, and the media depiction of the organization varies depending on the geographical source.
Within Nigeria, Black Axe is presented as a violent group of young men who threaten the local community by committing murder, kidnappings, and human trafficking (Babajide, 2021).
Around the world, Black Axe has been described as a “new kind of mafia” or a “new mob” (The Mob Reporter, 2016). Focused on cybercrime, their illicit activities are mostly non-violent but still destructive.
By conducting a LexisNexis search on Black Axe and their culture, I have concluded three dominant themes: cult membership, secrecy, and space. By exploring these themes, I aim to describe the cultural understanding of the Black Axe as depicted in the public realm, concluding that Black Axe is seen as a mysterious threat shrouded in secrecy.
Methods
The following content analysis was conducted using a LexisNexis search on Google, cross-referencing with related articles from the Lloyd Sealy Library. Collecting information from public records and various data sources offered insights into Black Axe's cultural attributes.
After an initial search on Google using the keywords Nigerian criminal organizations and culture, it became apparent that Black Axe is one of the most prolific and widely-reported groups in Google’s top results and news stories. I further refined the search to include keywords such as Black Axe culture, how do the Nigerian criminal organizations work, Nigerian criminal organizations structure, and relationship between Black Axe and government Nigeria.
I repeated these search terms in the Lloyd Sealy Library, where three significant articles were listed for Nigerian criminal organizations and culture. These articles include Linking Organizational Justice to Organizational Commitment Among Nigerian Police Officers (Sun et al. 2021), Italian Cops Try to Stop a Sex Trafficking Gang Called Black Axe (All Things Considered, 2018), and Pirate Towns: Reworking Social and Symbolic Infrastructures in Johannesburg and Douala (Simone, 2006).
Despite many Google articles and publications on Black Axe, there is very little information about the organization from academic sources, supporting the suggestion that the Nigerian criminal organization has not been studied, adding to the group’s reputation of secrecy.
Content analysis and discussion
Search results focused on the origins of Black Axe, how the group has expanded worldwide, and why they are seen as a significant threat. As several articles referenced Black Axe as a “new mafia,” I considered the comparison of Black Axe as a modern criminal syndicate to the traditional mafia, using the seven characteristics of the mafia as described by Reuter and Paoli (2020).
By exploring dominant themes of cult structure, secrecy, and space, it is apparent that Black Axe is not comparable to the traditional mafia despite global headlines.
A. Cult membership: Origins and cultural attributes of Black Axe
Before Black Axe was a known criminal threat, the Neo-Black Movement (NBM) of Africa began as a student fraternity founded in 1977 at the University of Benin in Benin City in Edo State (Luxury Drop, 2022). NBM initially aimed to oppose injustice and move against dictatorship (Höhn, 2021). NBM quickly evolved into a criminal splinter group known as Black Axe.
The NBM continues to exist by its own name as a legally recognized business with the Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission, with a self-reported 30,000 members and connections to high-profile politicians and philanthropic activities.
Various publications reference the NBM and Black Axe as synonymous, such as the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Refworld, 2012). However, the NBM has publicly disassociated itself from the Black Axe confraternity, notoriously known for dealing drugs, smuggling, and human trafficking (Daily Trust, 2021).
Typically referenced as a “cult” and “confraternity,” most of Black Axe's cultural attributes are speculated and/or unconfirmed. Reasons for joining Black Axe range from the potential to earn money and networking for safety (Luxury Drop, 2022) to forcibly recruiting members (Refworld, 2012).
Membership is reserved for educated males, and there is a stringent, secretive initiation process whereby recruits take an oath of allegiance. Once joining as a confraternity member, the commitment remains strong due to the spiritual link throughout the initiation process, which sometimes takes members to the verge of death.
Some sources claim that Axemen are stripped naked and forced to lie in mud while enduring severe physical abuse, crawl through their tormentors’ legs in a process known as “devil’s passage,” and drink blood (Luxury Drop, 2022). Other sources suggest that initiation ceremonies include bonfires, drugs, and the rape of women (Refworld, 2012). These descriptions instill an image of fear, violence, and cultism.
Axemen are identified by their clothing: black pants, a long-sleeved white shirt, a black beret, and a black coat with the axe insignia (Refworld, 2012). The black axe is also present in their logo, which features a black axe cutting the chains of a black man, with the word “AYE” below. For this reason, the “street cult” group is also called “the Aye” (Anazia, 2017).
Black Axe is known to use the threat of death against members wanting to leave or break the silence fundamental to the group’s membership and initiation process (Judah et al., 2021). The group is not revered by Nigerian people but feared as the Black Axe has a history of confraternity and connection to cultism, kidnappings, violence with rival gangs, and killings (Simwa & Walubengo, 2022).
B. Secrecy: Political connection and organization hierarchy
Despite the information available on Black Axe, the group remains mysterious. There are alleged links to politics, with a few known Black Axe members holding high positions in politics or business (Höhn, 2021). Yet the goal of Black Axe is not to achieve political domain but to penetrate politics to empower their own criminal agenda. Reports mention Nigeria has a long history of electoral violence (Carboni & Serwat, 2023), and Black Axe members play a significant role in instilling fear among voters (Shehu, 2021).
Examples of known Black Axe members who hold (or have held) political power include Augustus Bemigho and Tony Kabaka (Ukpong, 2021), the latter of who was briefly revered by the youth only to have his home riddled with bullets.
There is also reference made to Black Axe receiving money from officials, which has further aggravated rival-gang violence (Refworld, 2012). These corrupt political connections have contributed to hundreds of unsolved murders and multi-million dollar internet fraud globally (Sahara Reporters, 2021), with a lack of conviction for corruption (Hoffmann et al., 2016). It appears that Black Axe is working with (and in) the government but not for the benefit of the Nigerian people.
C. Space: Global expansion and misaligned reputation
Black Axe has become one of the most notorious criminal groups worldwide, with a presence throughout Africa, Europe, Asia, and North America. With an estimated membership of over 30,000 people, their expansion has been credited to meticulous planning, dividing geographic areas into zones, and designation of local chiefs. These zonal chiefs collect dues from persons in their jurisdiction (similar to membership fees) and forward the money to leaders in Nigeria (Luxury Drop, 2022).
While Black Axe is known for violence, cult killings, human trafficking, and smuggling in Nigeria, its global reputation seems less violent. Most international reports describe the “mafia-like network of cells” (Shehu, 2021) as a Pan-African movement that has lost its way (Williams, 2012), presenting a criminal threat through highly sophisticated cybercrime efforts, among other crimes including sexual exploitation (Becucci, 2022).
Black Axe has been described as one of the “gangs behind online fraud” (Vice, 2021) and has inspired the collective efforts of Interpol, national criminal investigation units, and other intelligence agencies.
Ultimately, Black Axe is seen as a mysterious and sinister cult-like mafia group with secret initiation ceremonies. Their cultural identity in Nigeria seems to differ from their identity abroad. Foreign media portrays Black Axe as a new type of mafia or mob, as their criminal activities are viewed through a European understanding of criminal syndicates.
While it is apparent that Black Axe operations and targets differ depending on their geographical location, there is insufficient academic research and certainty about Black Axe dynamics to dive deeper.
References
- Anazia, D. (July 15, 2017). Worrisome, rising cases of street cultism. The Guardian, Nigeria. Accessed on April 23, 2023, from https://guardian.ng/saturday-magazine/worrisome-rising-cases-of-street-cultism/
- Anisulowo, J. (September 25, 2022). Criminal gangs that have terrorized Nigeria over the last 5 decades. Skabash! Accessed on April 23, 2023, from https://www.skabash.com/criminal-gangs-in-nigeria/.
- Babjide, A. (December 02, 2021). Black Axe, Eiye cult clash claims six lives in Ondo. Daily Post. Accessed on April 23, 2023, from https://dailypost.ng/2021/12/02/black-axe-eiye-cult-clash-claims-six-lives-in-ondo/
- Becucci, S. (2022). Nigerian criminal groups in Italy: Organizational structure, drug trafficking, and sexual exploitation. Quaderni Di Sociologia, (88- XLVI), 71–91. https://doi.org/10.4000/qds.4839
- Carboni, A. & Serwat, L. (February 22, 2023). Political violence and the 2023 Nigerian election ACLED. Accessed on April 23, 2023, from https://acleddata.com/2023/02/22/political-violence-and-the-2023-nigerian-election/
- Daily Trust. (December 29, 2021). Neo-Black Movement dissociates itself from cult group, Black Axe. Accessed on April 23, 2023, from https://dailytrust.com/neo-black-movement-dissociates-self-from-cult-group-black-axe/
- Hoffmann, L., Smith, P., Clapham, C, & Vines, A. (May 06, 2016). Tracing the origins of Nigerian organized crime: Politics, corruption, and the growth of criminal networks. Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Accessed on April 23, 2023, from https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/events/2016-05-06-tracing-the-origins-of-nigerian-organized-crime.pdf
- Höhn, J. (April 07, 2021). The Nigerian mafia and human trafficking. Hope for the Future. Accessed on April 23, 2023, from https://www.hopeforthefuture.at/en/the-nigerian-mafia-and-human-trafficking/.
- Italian Cops Try To Stop A Sex Trafficking Gang Called Black Axe [Radio broadcast transcript]. (2018, May 16). All Things Considered, NA. https://link-gale-com.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/apps/doc/A539736725/OVIC?u=cuny_johnjay&sid=primo&xid=3f4d8b80
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