Prisons are likely to become more – rather than less – significant centers of gravity for the jihadist movement. We discuss some ways in which prisons matter during the radicalization process.
Scholars suggest that an individual’s criminal past impacts possible terrorist futures for the jihadist movement. In particular, Basra et al.’s research has emerged four main themes.
Radicalization and recruitment
The redemption narrative offers a radical change of values and behavior while encouraging a guilt-free sense of rebellion and anti-establishment. Crime is justified on religious grounds, whether or not the recruit has a religious background or understanding of Islam. In this instance, recruitment can be viewed as an unintended merging of criminal and jihadist narratives.
Prisons as a milieu
Prisons expose vulnerabilities in individuals susceptible to “cognitive openings” and the willingness to identify with new beliefs. Networking opportunities in prison lay the groundwork for radicalization, with rapid mobilization and solidification of radical beliefs occurring post-release.
Skills transfers
Jihadists also take advantage of criminal skills in prison, such as connections to gangs and weapons, and the soft skill of staying under the radar by using fake documents and safe houses. Familiarity with violence is also considered a skill transfer, as recruits with violent pasts are less likely to be psychologically hesitant to commit violent terrorist acts.
Criminal financing
Petty crime and criminal operations are known to finance terrorists, particularly their return to Syria. There has been a shift in terrorist financing from state-funded to micro-level self-funded methods (through criminal efforts). Jihadists also leverage the criminal financial strategy of encouraging a low barrier to entry, sharing their ideology to justify their crimes, and encouraging continued criminal behavior by simply shifting the purpose to meet jihadist ideals.
Institutional Responses
These findings challenge traditional views of radicalization and significantly impact counter-terrorism responses, forcing authorities to consider prisons a breeding ground for radicalization where, previously, foreign fighters were recruited from universities and places of religious worship.
Again, the criminal challenges of society (which now include terrorism) come back to addressing societal needs and effective rehabilitation efforts to impact change. Exploring this demands an entirely new discussion, but essentially, incorporating rehabilitation and post-release services as a priority in prisons rather than punitive measures could protect the vulnerable isolation of offenders and reduce recidivism (in the form of terrorist action).
There are several examples of jihadists who have emerged from the criminal-terrorist nexus in prison and caused severe damage. The case of Omar el-Hussein demonstrates both arguments — that prisons are a location for radicalization and that offenders are vulnerable people whose rehabilitation and reintegration are largely neglected.
El-Hussein was radicalized in prison and even red-flagged by authorities. After his release, a technicality prevented him from accessing probation services, leading him to be homeless and jobless, during which rapid radicalization occurred. Destitute and radicalized, he carried out the deadly shootings at a cultural center and a synagogue in Copenhagen in February 2015.
References
- Basra, R., Neumann, P., and Brunner, C. (2016). Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus. London: CSR.
- Burchett, J. & Weyembergh, A. (2023). Prison and detention conditions in the EU. IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs. Accessed on September 23, 2023, from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/741374/IPOL_STU(2023)741374_EN.pdf
- Clarke, C. (2016). Drugs and Thugs: Funding Terrorism through Narcotics Trafficking. Journal of Strategic Security, 9(3).
- Mikkelsen, R. (2007). U.S. prison system a costly and harmful failure: report. Reuters. Accessed on September 23, 2023, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-prisons-idUSN1841666120071119
- UNODC. (2017). Roadmap for the development of prison-based rehabilitation programs. Criminal Justice Handbook Series. Accessed on September 23, 2023, from https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/17-05452_ebook.pdf
As borders have become more porous, criminal mobility has become more accessible, contributing to transnational crime. Let’s assess the push and pull factors contributing to Nigeria’s Black Axe migration to South Africa.
Introduction to black axe
The Neo-Black Movement (NBM) began as a confraternity in Nigeria, Benin City. The group was established at the University of Benin during the 1970s as a student self-help association but gradually transformed into a criminal group in response to the political dictatorship in Nigeria, acting as a violent weapon to be used by political parties against the opposition.
The criminal splinter group became known as Black Axe and has since earned a notorious reputation for violence, murder, cult-like behavior, and transnational crime. While the legally-operating NBM has disassociated itself with Black Axe, many publications and research efforts still group the two organizations together. This analysis of their criminal mobility uses news articles, academic journals, and court documents to conclude that Black Axe began as an emergent criminal group due to political turmoil but has since developed to become a strategic, international organization. Headquartered in Nigeria, Black Axe “zones” are highly flexible, connected, and fluid, able to spread worldwide due to their flexibility and internal social bonds.
While most online literature focuses on Black Axe's presence in Italy, where they have been dubbed the “Nigerian Mafia,” I have selected to analyze their presence in South Africa due to my personal experience of witnessing Nigerian criminal organizations in action and my understanding of the South African landscape.
It is important to note that Black Axe's presence in Italy is strong, where criminal activity and methods differ greatly from that in South Africa — a discussion and analysis on its own.
General Impression of the Global Dimension of the Group
Since the 1980s, Nigerian organized crime has migrated worldwide, developing a strong presence in Italy and South Africa. Today, Black Axe operates across Africa and Europe, and they also target the United States of America via the Internet.
Push factors prompting migration of Black Axe
Initially, the international migration of Nigerian criminal groups developed due to a combination of three factors: the surge of wealth and accompanying corruption due to the discovery of oil in the 1950s, the second economic depression in the 1980s, and widespread corruption that led to mass migration.
South African pull factors
Due to pull factors, Black Axe and other Nigerian criminal organizations were established in South Africa, a fragile state with a high corruption and gang violence rate, making it an ideal location for facilitating various transnational criminal transactions.
Earlier reports of Black Axe operations in South Africa refer to drug trafficking crimes, where Axemen established strategic, operational bases near target clientele, such as brothels, and took advantage of South Africa’s post-apartheid political and social transition to succeed. Groups sometimes overtook entire neighborhoods, such as Hillbrow in Johannesburg.
Over time, the group adapted to flourish in cybercrimes such as internet fraud, romance scams, and money laundering to target international markets and leverage legal knowledge to avoid extradition and capture. South Africa has also served as a strategic springboard for Black Axe members to access more lucrative countries, such as Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. However, this does not necessarily describe transplantation, as the criminal operations and methods differ from one location to another.
South African PUSH factors
It is important to note that the racial tension and inequality in South Africa have the potential to develop into a push factor, encouraging Nigerian criminal organizations to move (or perhaps adapt their criminal behavior) as xenophobia creates a hostile environment. Nigerian gangs (and non-criminal Nigerians) have been the victims of violent attacks, facing extortion and death.
Black Axe networks
Despite Nigeria’s consistency as a politically and economically unstable country, Black Axe remains headquartered in Benin City and operates in regional areas called “zones.” The development of trusted networks with shared criminal objectives is explained by Corentin Cohen, who says that “networks of individuals working together for solidarity, economic or political objectives became categorized as organized crime or as a mafia.”
During an investigation into the pressing cyber threat in Africa, Rory Corcoran, acting head of Interpol’s new Financial Crime and Anti-Corruption Centre, said, “We are dealing with a highly organized international network. These guys are not opportunists… We’re mapping them out around the world.”
Court documents allege that Black Axe maintains a pyramidal command structure with zones worldwide, with the worldwide headquarters based in Benin City in Nigeria. Although the headquarters are based in Nigeria, the organization is not localized, contradicting the existing research of a “mafia” organization.
Criminal Mobility of Black Axe Members
Initially, it appears as though Black Axe demonstrates a unique convergence of both the importation/deprivation model of criminal mobility (as members are “pushed” out of a volatile home country in search of a better life) and the strategic, rational, and highly mobile theory of criminal mobility as the organization overlaps with the NBM and recruitment process is fairly strict, reflecting that of a confraternity.
A closer assessment of the group’s global expansion, strategic use of South Africa, and connection with the NBM suggest that Black Axe is predominantly a highly mobile and strategic organization with an operational base in Nigeria and territorial “zones” worldwide. The specific criminal activity and control methods differ depending on the environment of these territories, suggesting that these “zone” leaders have some authority to orchestrate actions and make international connections to thrive in the specific environment.
Limitations in the analysis
There are limitations in this analysis, with the following being the most significant.
- The overlap with the NBM makes it difficult to identify Black Axe members in leadership who buffer themselves from criminal activity.
- Sensationalized headlines mislead the reality of the group’s progression from dealing drugs to romance scams in South Africa, such as the BBC’s headline The ultra-violent cult that became a global mafia.
- The secrecy surrounding the Black Axe confraternity cult’s origins and methods makes it difficult to investigate true motives, recruitment methods, and strategies for expansion.
- Using the example of Italy and South Africa, Black Axe, it is obvious that different primary crimes and methods in various regions make it difficult to assess the criminal organization as a whole.
- Alikening Black Axe and the “Nigerian Mafia” to the Italian mafia introduces misconceptions about the organization, including their origins and methods.
References
- Becucci, S. (2022). Nigerian criminal groups in Italy: Organizational structure, drug trafficking and sexual exploitation. Quaderni Di Sociologia, (88–XLVI), 71–91. https://doi.org/10.4000/qds.4839
- Bernardo, C. (2017). Migration of the Nigerian mafia. University of Cape Town News. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2017-05-16-migration-of-the-nigerian-mafia.
- Burke, J. (2022). Gangs of cybercriminals expanding across Africa, investigators say. The Guardian. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/nov/27/gangs-of-cybercriminals-are-expanding-across-africa-investigators-say.
- Campana, P. (2011). Eavesdropping on the Mob: The Functional Diversification of Mafia Activities across Territories, European Journal of Criminology, 8(3), 213–228.
- Cohen, C. (2022). The “Nigerian mafia” feedback loop: European police, global media, and Nigerian civil society. Trends Organ Crim. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-022-09471-0
- Daily Trust. (December 29, 2021). Neo-Black Movement dissociates itself from cult group, Black Axe. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://dailytrust.com/neo-black-movement-dissociates-self-from-cult-group-black-axe/
- Dolley, C. (2022). Clash of the cartels: Unmasking the global drug kingpins stalking South Africa. Maverick 451. Evans, J. (2023). Alleged ‘Black Axe’ scammers challenging extradition to US. News 24. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/alleged-black-axe-scammers-challenging-extradition-to-us-20230607
- Hassan, T. (2022). Nigeria: Events of 2022. Human Rights Watch. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/nigeria.
- Hyman, A. (2021). Nigerian mafia leaders arrested after Hawks swoop in Cape Town. Times Live. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-10-19-nigerian-mafia-leaders-arrested-as-sa-and-us-forces-swoop-in-cape-town/.
- Interpol. (2022). Financial crime: South African fraud gang dismantled. Interpol News and Events. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2022/Financial-crime-South-African-fraud-gang-dismantled.
- Mail & Guardian. (2002). Nigerians dominate cocaine trade in SA. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://mg.co.za/article/2002-05-08-nigerians-dominate-cocaine-trade-in-sa/.
- Northcott, C., Judah, S., & Macjob, P. (2021). The ultra-violent cult that became a global mafia. BBC. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59614595
- Nwakuonr, G.A. & Nwanne, C. (2018). Why South Africans attack Nigerians. The Guardian. Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://guardian.ng/features/why-south-africans-attack-nigerians/.
- SAFLII. (September, 2022). Osagiede and Others v S (A95/22) [2022] ZAWCHC 166; [2022] 4 All SA 845 (WCC). Accessed on September 17, 2023, from http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2022/166.html.
- United States of America v. Osagiede, 2021R00423/JLH/W. (United States District Court of New Jersey). Accessed on September 17, 2023, from https://www.justice.gov/d9/press-releases/attachments/2021/10/20/osagiedeetal.indictment_0.pdf.
Dan Bloom wrote an article for Daily Mail, introducing creative and innovative ways of trafficking drugs across borders and describing operations orchestrated by relatively small and loosely structured organizations.
These efforts, such as filling empty beer cans with narcotics and surgically implanting drugs in pet labradors, demonstrate the ever-evolving methods and techniques used by drug traffickers to move illegal substances across borders.
Smuggling and Operational Methods
The smuggling and operational methods mentioned in Dan Bloom’s article can be grouped as follows:
- Commercial air courier operations, such as someone using a skull-shaped packet of cocaine under a black wig while flying
- Couriers using other modes of transport, such as smuggling marijuana on a surfboard across the US-Mexico border
- Hiding drugs among unaccompanied legitimate commerce, such as traffickers filling furniture with more than five tonnes of cannabis, worth £12 million, through a port on the coast of England (the details of the drugs being unaccompanied among legitimate cargo are assumed from the article but not confirmed)
Calculated Chance of Success
Of the above, efforts where narcotics have been hidden in existing cargo present a rational and calculated chance of success. Hiding large volumes of contraband in unaccompanied, legitimate cargo presents an important smuggling strategy.
The necessary manpower is limited to supplying and receiving the narcotics, not the actual transition. As long as a connection with or access to a legitimate cargo company is established, large volumes of drugs can be trafficked via port entry without necessarily making the commercial shipper complicit in the scheme, reducing the risk of arrest and the number of players involved.
The Risk of Couriers
Most of the efforts mentioned in Dan Bloom’s article are carried out by couriers who have failed (without suggesting previous successes using the same method). The argument that using a courier is high risk aligns with Caulkins et al.’s paper that explores how illegal drugs enter the United Kingdom. The paper reveals that most interviewees acted as couriers and were caught on their first attempt at trafficking drugs, with the arrest risk being considerable, especially for novices (implying that there is a skill to master and succeed as a courier). Costs include the fee-for-service arrangement, the travel ticket, the cost of the drugs (limited to what a single person can carry or transport), and the high risk of a snitch.
Overall, using a courier is a small-time operation with high risk and moderate reward. Assessing the situation further, the existence of X-rays that can identify ingested narcotics and sniffer dogs that can smell a range of drugs at major airports increases the risk of discovery among commercial air couriers. Land and port border control also use scanning technology, but as reported by Bernstein in NBC Montana, CBP currently scans only 2% of all private passenger vehicles and 16% of commercial vehicles at land borders, suggesting that the risk of detection is fairly low compared to commercial air options.
Additional operational Methods
One operational method not mentioned in Bloom’s article is using corrupt truck drivers to smuggle drugs across borders, arguably the most lucrative method with the lowest risk of being captured. Caulkins et al. describe how truck driver operations span several years without being caught, move large volumes of illicit cargo, and involve smaller groups of minor players to split profits.
Perhaps the fact that none of these “corrupt vehicle operator” efforts are mentioned in Bloom’s article is a testament to the success of the method, or perhaps the lack of this operational method on the list suggests that it is not creative enough to be featured. Regardless, this operational method offers relatively low barriers to entry with a high chance of success, making it a viable option for rationally-acting smuggling operations.
References
- Bernstein, L. (2019). Vehicle scanning technology at the border is about to ruin the drug trade. NBC Montana. Accessed on September 10, 2023, from https://nbcmontana.com/news/nation-world/vehicle-scanning-technology-at-the-border-is-about-to-ruin-the-drug-trade
- Bloom, D. (2009). Busted! Ingenious (but failed) attempts by the world's drug dealers to outsmart customs using fake nappies, surfboards, and bottles of Champagne. Mail Online. Accessed on September 10, 2023, from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2711652/Busted-Ingenious-failed-attempts-world-s-drug-dealers-outsmart-customs-using-fake-nappies-surfboards-bottles-Champagne.html
- Caulkins, J.P., Burnett, H., & Leslie, E. (2009). How illegal drugs enter an island country: Insights from interviews with incarcerated smugglers. Global Crime 10(1&2), 66-93
Research reveals a number of possible existential motivations for engaging in terrorism. Are these research findings important for understanding international terrorism, or are they unreliable?
When aligning with the positivist school of criminology, which considers internal or external influences on individuals as the primary cause of criminal behavior, it would be short-sighted to ignore the existential factors that motivate international terrorists.
Existential motivations
Cottee & Hayward explore three existential motivations for engaging in terrorism, namely the desire for excitement, the desire for ultimate meaning, and the desire for glory.
The authors also describe the goal of terrorism as two-fold: pursuing the political goals of small groups and exploring the site of individual self-drama and self-reinvention.
Researching existential motivation demands a qualitative approach to research, which is used to find meanings, feelings, and underlying opinions, therefore playing an essential role in understanding why individuals engage in international terrorism.
Cottee & Hayward did a convincing job to shed light on the motivations for engaging in international terrorism and how to manage the threat by exploring how terrorist agents feel and the emotional complexity of terrorism. However, other efforts are necessary for a more holistic understanding of the phenomenon.
Social network Theory
Bruinsma & Bernasco discuss the social network theory in line with other transnational crimes, describing social collaboration and organization in light of financial and legal risks. International terrorism suggests that the rewards are more “existential,” which introduces difficulty in applying the social network theory (which is focused on social organizations surrounding financial and legal risks).
Even so, international terrorist groups seem to consist of close-knit, cohesive, and ethically homogenous groups of people with shared spiritual or political beliefs, likening them to Bruinsma & Bernasco’s description of smuggling and large-scale heroin trading groups.
rational choice theory
Perry & Hasisi move away from the positivist school of criminology and discuss rational choice theory to review the religious, personal, and social incentives demonstrated by those who kill themselves in suicide attacks.
They argue that suicide bombers (in particular) are driven by the anticipation of costs and benefits, and they are committed to maximizing self-gratifying, beneficial behavior.
connecting the dots
Reviewing both theories closely, it’s possible to draw parallels between positivist and classical approaches and determine the overlaps in religious motivation and the desire to elevate the self. Both require a focus on mentality and empirical research, which ‘reads between the lines’ of quantitative research to understand social phenomena better.
Outside of the terrorist agent, modern developments also play a significant role in the increase in international terrorism, such as improved communication technologies, deregulated financial markets, and increased flow of people and products across borders.
All of these external factors should be considered in conjunction with internal and existential factors to gain a better understanding of the rise of international terrorism. As a unique transnational crime that includes a strong political agenda instead of a financial one, international terrorism demands a closer look at the existential motives, making Cottee & Hayward’s reading valuable.
References
- Bruinsma, G. & Bernasco, W. (2004). Criminal Groups and Transnational Illegal Markets: Examination on the Basis of Social Network Theory, Crime, Law & Social Change 41: 79–94.
- Cottee, S. and Hayward, K. (2011). Terrorist (e)motives: The existential attractions of terrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34, 963–986.
- Perry, & Hasisi, B. (2015). Rational Choice Rewards and the Jihadist Suicide Bomber. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(1), 53–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.962991
- LibreTexts. (July 17, 2023). Globalization and Transnational Crime in Human Security in World Affairs - Problems and Opportunities 2e. Accessed on September 03, 2023
- UNODC. (2018). Module 1: Introduction to International Terrorism in Education for Justice University Module Series: Counter-Terrorism. Accessed on September 03, 2023
The ambiguity of numbers and statistics has the potential for misleading interpretations, as is evident in the case of seizing and interdicting drugs at and beyond U.S. borders. Why is measuring interdiction “success” politically tricky?
Not only are drug seizure figures used as evidence for policy success, but they remain largely unchallenged while serving multiple interests (and functions) for different state departments.
mythical numbers
Peter Andreas explores how “mythical numbers” occur due to various reasons. For example, he mentions that some numbers are noticeably missing, some are recycled through the media without accountability, and unimpressive numbers are suppressed. These issues, and more, present interdiction success as “decorations” for the policy process.
Essentially, these issues boil down to the lack of accountability for the purity of the figures and their source, an issue that is aggravated by different government agencies competing against one another for budget allocation and politicians attempting to prove policy success.
US border as a political battleground
Using the US border as a battleground between Democrats and Republicans is a tale as old as time, with Republicans attempting to control illicit drug flow and immigration as a priority to advance their agenda.
Operation intercept
Consider President Nixon’s Operation Intercept, an anti-drug measure that resulted in a near shutdown of border crossings between Mexico and the United States in 1969, a significant effort in his campaign. The practice of using misleading numbers is still prevalent today.
Justin Reid describes Operation Intercept as “an exercise in international extortion” where journalists reported questionable statistics provided by the government to promote (and question) Nixon’s upcoming war on drugs, which followed two years later.
Operation Lone Star
The practice of using misleading numbers is still prevalent today. The Marshall Project published an article demonstrating how political leaders amplify specific figures and shift metrics to further their campaign and policy agenda. An investigation of Operation Lone Star reveals how Texas Governor Greg Abbott skewed data to describe a multi-billion dollar border operation as successful in an effort to get re-elected.
An investigation by ProPublica, The Texas Tribune, and The Marshall Project found, “The state’s claim of success has been based on shifting metrics that included crimes with no connection to the border, work conducted by troopers stationed in targeted counties prior to the operation, and arrest and drug seizure efforts that do not clearly distinguish DPS’s role from that of other agencies.” The article is quite in-depth and dives into specific details of Operation Lone Star and how the figures were used as weapons in the fight to support Governor Abbott’s policy goal of securing the border (and getting reelected).
Policy, Numbers and Transnational Crime
This commentary would only be complete by mentioning that policy is challenging to measure with complete transparency, attention to specific (relevant) indicators, and accountability. In the illicit flow of goods, money, and people, where gathering and measuring data is even more challenging, attention to reliability and validity is very important. Using the US border as an example, it's apparent how policy and the reaction to transnational crime has an impact on the US criminal justice system (and global efforts to target cross-border crimes).
References
- Arsovska, J. (2011). Conceptualizing and studying organized crime in a global context. In C. Smith, S. Zhang, R. Barberet, Routledge Handbook of International Criminology. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Andreas, P. (2010). The Politics of Measuring Illicit Flows and Policy Effectiveness - Alternative Formats In: P Andreas, KM Greenhill (eds.), Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict (pp. 23-45). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
- Reid, J. M. (2022). “An exercise in international extortion”: Operation “Intercept” and Nixon’s 1969 war on drugs (Order No. 29995846). Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. (2742630076). Retrieved from https://ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/exercise-international-extortion-operation/docview/2742630076/se-2
Discuss existing and potential governmental responses to right-wing nationalism and neo-Nazism in one or several countries. Are these punitive and preventive measures sufficient in addressing those ideologies?
The severity of the threat of right-wing terrorism has been debated in recent years, with many arguing that right-wing terrorism is rising, particularly compared to Islamic religious terrorism. Other analysts argue that the threat is overstated (Jones et al., 2020).
However, right-wing terrorism’s connection to right-wing nationalism and neo-Nazism, and the associated threat of violence, xenophobia, and political turbulence, presents a security threat to the United States and the rest of the world (Koehler, 2015).
It is essential that national governments introduce both punitive and preventive policies to address rising ideologies of hatred and violence.
I will briefly discuss the rise of right-wing nationalism and neo-Nazism in Europe (using the Pan-Nordic region as an example) and the United States of America. Next, I will compare existing governmental responses and assess the effectiveness of these measures. Finally, I will recommend additional policy efforts to consider.
Presence of right-wing nationalism and neo-Nazism
The resurgence of right-wing nationalism, a political ideology that combines right-wing politics and populist rhetoric and themes, desires to bring back power to the people and is typically antithetical to liberal democracy (Halikiopoulou, 2019).
Right-wing nationalism is typically hegemonic in its cause as a collective (Halikiopoulou, 2019), and extreme right-wing nationalism and activism are connected with neo-Nazi subcultures that exercise violence and racism (Mattsson & Johansson, 2021).
Some of these right-wing extremist groups are based within a certain region, while others are transactional in nature (and threat). By comparing extreme right-wing nationalism between Pan-Nordic countries and the United States, I hope to draw on similarities and differences between the threat.
Right-wing nationalism in Pan-Nordic countries
Much of the focus on right-wing nationalism is centered on Europe, home to several established right-wing terrorist networks. For example, Nordiska motståndsrörelsen (Nordic Resistance Movement, or NRM) is a transnational neo-Nazi organization that operates in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland. The NRM has threatened and attacked minority groups such as homosexual communities, Muslim asylum seekers, and ideological rivals (Jones et al., 2020).
Consider Denmark in the 1980s. The country experienced increased immigration which led to the emergence of a xenophobic subculture and the strong presence of the radical right. Various political and social movements have evolved the radical right into a social movement that includes nationalist associations, militant skinheads, and neo-Nazis.
While there have been lulls in popularity as rival ideologies counter the efforts of the extreme right, national and international circumstances in the past two decades have offered new opportunities for the Danish radical right — both in the streets and as a parliamentary voice (Karpantschof & Mikkelsen, 2017). Similar trends and developments have emerged in other Pan-Nordic countries.
Right-wing nationalism in the United States of America
In the United States, the Anti-Defamation League’s Center on Extremism has assembled a list of 150 right-wing terrorist acts and attempts between 1993 to 2017 (ADL report, 2022).
Unlike European examples, where right-wing nationalists are often members of organized and/or political groups, many of these attacks in the United States are seemingly executed by lone perpetrators connected to (or inspired by) an underground network with leaderless resistance (Frontline PBS, 2020). Most right-wing extremist attacks fall under two categories: white supremacists (including neo-Nazis) and anti-government extremists (ADL report, 2022).
In recent years, organized groups branded right-wing nationalists in the United States, such as the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers, have become more prominent. As in the Pan-Nordic region, certain international and social developments have created a platform for right-wing nationalists to gain momentum. For example, the strengthening of liberal political parties and their ideologies (Pahnke, 2021) and the military response to white-power activism (Frontline PBS, 2020).
Existing governmental responses and effectiveness
Political and social expression is fundamental in right-wing nationalism and extremist movements, and governmental policies are necessary to prevent and punish threats and acts of violence.
Governmental responses in Pan-Nordic countries
The NMR is pro-violence and uncompromising, spreading its political agenda and leveraging different kinds of violence, threats, and harassment to prevent retaliation. Yet the NMR remains a legal organization (in Sweden), and NMR members swiftly confront politicians who criticize the movement (Kenes, 2021).
NMR leadership dismisses illegal activities committed by members as isolated and independent acts. In response, the government has mapped out the most active members in the NMR. A minority percentage have been convicted or prosecuted for crimes, with almost a quarter of cases leading to imprisonment. The NMR is also on the radar of the Swedish Security Police (Säpo), who have classified the NMR’s violent tendencies as the second biggest threat in Sweden (after Islamic terrorism) (Kenes, 2021).
Apart from monitoring groups and punishing violent perpetrators, the government is also implementing policies that prioritize equality and promote equal treatment of all persons without discrimination based on gender, race, or ethnic origin. For example, Denmark has established the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR). In addition, the court has found discriminatory video statements by the leader of the Hard Line extreme-right party not to be protected by freedom of speech (ECRI, 2022).
Some European countries have banned right-wing extremist networks and placed sanctions on right-wing extremist groups that allow governments to freeze financial assets and criminalize group members. However, the internet and social media forums remain important platforms for right-wing extremists to spread propaganda and coordinate their actions (Jones et al., 2020).
Other efforts to strengthen democracy against extreme right-wing nationalism in Sweden include initiatives to increase election turnout to enhance democratic awareness, implement democracy-promoting initiatives in civil society, promote democracy in schools, and protect human rights by combatting discrimination, xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance. Culture is prioritized as part of the democratic system, and there are initiatives to reduce exclusion among young people and foreign-born individuals (Björklund & Ohlsson, 2011).
Governmental responses in the United States of America
In the United States of America, the comparable right-wing movement is composed of a “highly diverse and loosely connected network of individuals and groups who reject U.S. laws, taxation, currency, and the government’s legitimacy, especially regarding the control of firearms.” (Koehler, 2015).
The fluid and underground nature of these groups makes it difficult for law enforcement to detect communication and group structures before a violent event occurs. Even so, the United States has not banned any far-right organizations (Jones et al., 2020), and the focus remains on religious terrorist networks such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.
Although not always apparent, the early warning signs of violent right-wing actions are often ignored, as was the case with the January 06 storming of the Capitol Building, which revealed the lack of preparation for the event and the failure to translate operational intelligence into an effective preventative plan (Perliger, 2023).
Policy recommendations focus on better communication and coordination between the federal government, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies to prevent future events of a similar nature. Public education and awareness of the threat of domestic terrorism is also a priority (Perliger, 2023).
As punishment, civil lawsuits for damages by the victims of far-right violence have been an effective tool (Perliger, 2023). The Biden Administration has also introduced a new unit within the Justice Department that consists of a team of attorneys dedicated to investigating domestic terrorism and tightening the focus on U.S. national security within the borders (Bergengruen & Hennigan, 2022).
Effectiveness of governmental responses
While these preventive and punitive measures acknowledge the threat of extreme right-wing nationalism and neo-Nazi movements, the threat remains understated and debated.
Both the loose and fluid nature of these networks in the United States of America (as well as the country’s strong policy on free speech) and the political authority of these organizations in Pan-Nordic countries suggest that greater effort is needed to focus on preventing the threat of violence.
By studying the United States and the Pan-Nordic region as two Western regions with differing politics and cultures, it is apparent that nuanced efforts are needed to address the cause of right-wing nationalism and the triggers that inspire growth in each region. Some of these efforts will overlap, while others are more specific to the political and social climate.
Potential governmental responses
Mattsson and Johansson (2020) report on the role school and teachers play in handling racism in schools to prevent the growth of the neo-Nazi movement in Sweden. Results show that attempts to isolate troubled students lead to resistance and stigmatization, which fuel the radicalization process. To prevent this from happening, schools and their staff should be educated on the difference between promoting an anti-racist agenda and satisfying the cognitive and emotional needs of racist students.
A long-term approach is recommended by Perliger, who suggests the development of socialization and behavioral processes can prevent political polarization in the United States (2023). A push for developing mechanisms and solutions that address the spreading of hate speech, misinformation, and extremist rhetoric in online spheres should also be a key focus (Perliger, 2023).
In both regions, public education on immigration and its implications are crucial for improving tolerance for migrant communities. Reeskens & van Oorschot suggest that public opinion toward migrants originates from “aspirations about citizenship, as well as perceptions about its realization” (2017). Policymakers should be concerned about the impact of misinformation and how it correlates with immigration policies to nurture a public opinion of tolerance.
Finally, the origins of violence should be considered and intercepted. Mattsson and Johansson study how violence is reproduced and how a violent upbringing and a violent environment during childhood create ideal conditions for a violent neo-Nazi lifestyle (2021). Effective prevention strategies are essential to promote awareness about child mistreatment and to foster a commitment to social change, especially for at-risk children in schools.
References
- ADL Report. (2022). A Dark and Constant Rage: 25 Years of Right-Wing Terrorism in the United States. Accessed on May 20, 2023, from https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/CR_5154_25YRS%20RightWing%20Terrorism_V5.pdf
- Bergengruen, V. & Hennigan, W. (January 24, 2022). Prosecuting Domestic Terrorism is Notoriously Difficult. This New Team of Lawyers Has a Mounting Caseload. TIME. Accessed on May 20, 2023, from https://time.com/6140308/domestic-terrorism-justice-department-unit-joe-biden/
- Björklund, J. & Ohlsson, B. (2011). Action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism. Government Offices of Sweden. Accessed on May 20, 2023, from https://www.government.se/contentassets/b94f163a3c5941aebaeb78174ea27a29/action-plan-to-safeguard-democracy-against-violence-promoting-extremism-sr.-20111244 ECRI. (2022).
- ECRI Report on Denmark (sixth monitoring cycle). Council of Europe. Accessed on May 20, 2023, from https://rm.coe.int/6th-ecri-report-on-denmark-/1680a6d5e4
- Frontline PBS | Official. (November 03, 2020). Documenting Hate: New American Nazis (full documentary) | Frontline. [Video]. YouTube https://youtu.be/-XFBVAAzXjc
- Halikiopoulou, D. (2019) Right-wing populism as a nationalist vision of legitimating collective choice: a supply-side perspective. The International Spectator, 54 (2). pp. 35-49. ISSN 0393-2729 doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2019.1588544
- Jones, S., G., Doxsee, C., and Harrington, N. (March 2020). The right-wing terrorism threat in Europe. A report of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Center for Strategies and International Studies.
- Karpantschof, R., & Mikkelsen. F. (2017). The rise and transformation of the radical right movement in Denmark 1980–2015. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, 8, 712-730.
- Kenes, B. (April 2020). NMR: A Nordic neo-Nazi organization with aims of establishing totalitarian rule across Scandinavia. ECPS. Accessed on May 20, 2023, from https://www.populismstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ECPS-Organisational-Profile-Series-4.pdf
- Koehler, D. (2015). Right-wing extremism and terrorism in Europe. Current developments and issues for the future. Prism 6, 2, 85-104.
- Mattsson, Ch. & Johansson, Th. (2020) The hateful other neo-Nazis in school and teachers strategies for handling racism, British Journal of Sociology of Education 41, 8,1149-1163,
- Mattsson, Ch., & Johansson, Th. (2021). “We are the White Aryan Warriors”: Violence, homosociality, the construction of masculinity in the National Socialist Movement in Sweden. Men and Masculinities 24, 3, 393-410.
- Pahnke, A. (March 31, 2021). How the far right got a stranglehold on the West. Aljazeera. Accessed on May 20, 2023, from https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/3/31/how-the-far-right-got-a-stranglehold-on-the-west
- Perliger, A. (January 02, 2023). Contextualizing the Jan 6th Report: Contemporary Trends in Far-Right Violence in the US. ICCT. Accessed on May 20, 2023, from https://www.icct.nl/publication/contextualising-jan-6th-report-contemporary-trends-far-right-violence-us
- Reeskens, T., & Van Oorschot, W. (2017). Conceptions of Citizenship and Tolerance towards Immigrants. In Oxford University Press eBooks (pp. 177–198). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198795452.003.0007
Consider the challenges in conducting qualitative research, such as risk and danger in conducting fieldwork, multicultural and multilingual settings, and limited resources.
Various qualitative research methods offer significant interpretative value and produce culturally rich analyses (Blake, 2020), but it doesn’t come without their risks and challenges. Qualitative research in a global or international context introduces additional risks and challenges, especially when considering multicultural and multilingual settings as cultural differences.
Ethical considerations
Qualitative researchers enter a new location as an outsider. This status doesn’t change regardless of how well-acquainted the researcher becomes with the community (IQR Toolkit, 2021). When conducting research in a violent setting, these risks and dangers become more prominent.
One of the most important considerations and challenges involves guaranteeing the privacy and anonymity of participants in a dangerous space and protecting vulnerable groups, including those susceptible to gender discrimination (Blake, 2020). Researchers must consider surveillance and time of interviews when planning interviews in dangerous environments.
Blake emphasizes the importance of minimizing all participants’ risks to personal safety (2020). Failure to understand the local culture and follow these guidelines could introduce life-threatening repercussions from violent agents in the space (state, gang culture, or other).
Askanius (2019) introduces a critical question that all researchers should use throughout the process — why and for whom are we producing research on these groups, and what ethical considerations and problems related to intent could arise?
Environmental considerations
While speaking about the dangerous spaces in Latin American and Caribbean countries, Blake (2020) points to political turbulence and state-led violence, gang culture due to the drug trade, and violence within communities due to poor economic circumstances and weak leadership. As an outsider entering this space, it is essential to have a gatekeeper who can navigate the spaces, increase trust, and serve as a buffer to cultural conflict.
Environmental factors can reduce accessibility to research sites for fieldwork. For example, Blake describes how Jill (a pseudonym) had difficulty accessing a site due to military presence, which interfered with her research objectives and schedule (2020). Accessibility is also impacted by gang violence and language barriers.
In other instances, environmental health risks can also present a risk and challenge when conducting fieldwork. Sonia Richter discusses weather, roads, and even health risks (such as the Ebola outbreak) impacting safety when conducting fieldwork in Ghana. Looking at international health guidelines helps navigate this challenge (IQR Toolkit, 2021).
Cultural and identity considerations
Finally, it is important to note that the researcher’s identity impacts fieldwork processes and safety in the field. While a gatekeeper helps soften the clash of cultures or languages, there is usually an element of distrust when an outsider enters the environment. This level of distrust may vary depending on the race, culture, ethnicity, age, and gender of the researcher.
Blake reveals how distrust is experienced through both familiarity and unfamiliarity. For example, Blake’s identity as a dark-skinned Jamaican man allowed him to connect with research participants. However, it also introduced skepticism as the participants were suspicious that he worked for the government or a law enforcement agency (2020).
Alternatives to fieldwork?
There is the option to use video conferencing to facilitate focus groups for qualitative data collection. However, there are significant challenges and limitations, even in ideal situations where participants are adept with technology and have the necessary resources (Greenspan et al., 2021). For example, poor connection, high attrition rate, and inability to read body language.
References
- Askanius, T. (2019). Studying the Nordic Resistance Movement: Three urgent questions for researchers of contemporary neo-Nazis and their media practices. Media, Culture & Society 41, 6, 878–888.
- Blake, D.K. (2020). Researching violence: Conducting risky fieldwork in dangerous spaces across Latin America and the Caribbean. Journal of Ethnographic & Qualitative Research 14, 153–169.
- Greenspan, S.B., Gordon, K.L., Whitcomb, S.A., and Lauterbach, A.A. (2021). Use of video conferencing to facilitate focus groups for qualitative data collection. American Journal of Qualitative Research 5, 1, 85-93.
- IQR Toolkit (November 18, 2021). Conducting Qualitative Research in an International Context. [Video]. YouTube https://youtu.be/teMrM32vpSo
What is the role of media and schools in propagating and/or preventing interests and membership in extremist organizations?
Radical right-wing movements emerge from specific political and social contexts, such as increasing immigration and xenophobic subcultures (Karpantschof & Mikkelsen, 2017).
These movements attract and recruit individuals with shared historical experiences and/or present fears. Some of these historical experiences extend back to schools where teachers have indirectly (or directly) contributed to the appeal of extremist organizations.
Primary and secondary stigmatization in schools
Mattsson & Johannsson explore the role of primary and secondary stigmatization by analyzing the voices of former neo-Nazis and their teachers.
The study reveals commonalities among interviewed former-school children who joined extremist groups, such as violence in the home, unsupportive parents, psychological distress, and a lack of stimulation. These socially vulnerable environments contributed to primary stigmatization in school, which transformed into secondary stigmatization through confrontations where they could retaliate with violence.
Most importantly, these students found community and belonging among the local skinheads and the neo-Nazi movement. Through the study, there is a visible pattern of stigmatization, resistance, and identity formation. Whether or not these developments could have been intercepted is a discussion necessary for future generations.
Failed responses that drive membership
Teachers were unequipped to manage and support these students who developed a “violence capital” (Mattsson & Johannsson, 2020). Instead, the school attempted to contain their behavior through isolation and correction — which further fed secondary stigmatization. Students were already untrusting of adults due to their tumultuous home lives, and the lack of support or awareness from the school amplified this frustration.
The study concludes that the school (and the teachers) were unable to differentiate between promoting an anti-racist agenda and “satisfying the cognitive and emotional needs of the racist students” (Mattsson & Johannsson, 2020).
Instead, the increased isolation drove students to extremist groups where they felt a sense of belonging and discovered a way to express themselves without judgment from their peers.
Rise of the youth involved
Right-wing terrorism is rising. With the modern advantage of technology, far-right extremists have become increasingly active on social media and the internet. As Jones suggests, this online activity has moved the primary battlefield against right-wing terrorism to the virtual world rather than the streets (2020). The process of online radicalization of youth is a global and multi-faced phenomenon. Social media, in particular, is used as a strategic tool to try and incite violent behavior (Alava et al., 2017).
The mainstream media, which contributes to mobilizing radical forces by covering public debates, has further opened opportunities for radicals to exploit (Karpantschof & Mikkelsen, 2017).
As the Radicalisation Awareness Network confirms, the new right-wing extremists emerging on the scene are much younger, and we can not ignore the spread of fake news, which is described to be “like a virus” (2020).
Schools provide an early opportunity to identify vulnerable individuals and meet their cognitive, emotional, and educational needs to reduce recruitment to right-wing extremist networks.
References
- Alava, S., Frau-Meigs, D., & Hassan, G. (2017). Youth and violent extremism on social media: mapping the research. UNESCO Publishing
- Jones, S., G., Doxsee, C., and Harrington, N. (March 2020). The right-wing terrorism threat in Europe. A report of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Center for Strategies and International Studies.
- Karpantschof, R., & Mikkelsen. F. (2017). The rise and transformation of the radical right movement in Denmark 1980–2015. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, 8, 712-730.
- Mattsson, Ch. & Johansson, Th. (2020) The hateful other neo-Nazis in school and teachers' strategies for handling racism. British Journal of Sociology of Education 41, 8,1149-1163
- Radicalisation Awareness Network (2020, May 22). The rise of violent right-wing extremism in Europe. [Video]. YouTube https://youtu.be/vCxSCfaNgoI.
Based on culture or religion, some nations may have different crimes or definitions of crime. How can this be reconciled to have an international standard to measure crime? Is it even necessary to do so?
This discussion brings up the notion of sovereignty. I believe that every nation has the responsibility to protect its citizens through local laws and democratic processes. As a result, certain values and ethics are highlighted within broader communities, contributing to differing laws from one country to another.
An Example of Local Laws
For example, the legal drinking age in South Africa is 18 years old. Technically speaking, failure to comply with these rules and regulations can lead to R1,000,000 (approximately $54,317) fine or up to five years behind bars, and establishments that sell alcohol to minors risk losing their liquor licenses.
However, these penalties are reserved for the most serious offenders and are seldom exercised (Law 101, 2021). Unfortunately, South Africa has a heavy drinking culture, and lobby groups are putting pressure on the government to raise the legal drinking age to 21 (World Health Organization, 2018).
In the United States, the legal drinking age is 21 years old. If caught purchasing, consuming, or possessing alcohol while underage, it is normally a misdemeanor criminal offense. Punishment may include fines, attending alcohol counseling or classes, performing hours of community service, and getting a driver’s license revocation. Some believe that lowering the legal drinking age to 18 will reduce the number of offenders (Griggs, 2015).
I do not aim to argue which drinking age is more effective in preventing alcohol abuse or related tragedies, but only to show the existing law of each country and how the talk of change is based on the social culture.
Do We Need to Reconcile These Laws?
In this instance, I do not think it is necessary to reconcile these laws to meet an international standard, as the drinking age in South Africa has little to no effect on the citizens of the United States (or vice versa). It is the responsibility of the national government and lawmakers to make democratically-founded decisions that serve the best interest of their citizens (based on culture and religion, among other factors).
This argument may take a different direction when considering non-democratic countries where the voices of the people are not always heard, and there is the risk of damaging authoritarian rule.
Holding Certain Laws to an International Standard
However, there are certain laws that I do believe should be held to an international standard. In particular, customary international laws and customary international humanitarian laws are important to consider as the world becomes increasingly globalized and different cultures and religions share the same space.
These laws, such as the principle of non-refoulment, are fundamental to preserving human life, help to regulate transnational organized crime, and recognize the basic rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings (Jensen, 2016).
As the world becomes increasingly globalized, these laws help protect citizens and regulate crime when local laws are ineffective or irrelevant.
References
- Griggs, B. (January 4, 2015). Should the U.S. lower its drinking age? CNN. Retrieved on 16 March 2023 from https://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/16/us/legal-drinking-age/index.html
- Jenson, E. (2016). Introduction to the Laws of Kurdistan, Iraq: Working Paper Series, Transnational Criminal Law. Standford Law School and the American University of Iraq Sulaimani. Retrieved on 16 March 2023 from https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ILEI-Transnational-Crim-Law-2016.pdf
- Law 101. (July 5, 2021). What is the law on underage drinking? Retrieved on 16 March 2023 from https://law101.org.za/what-is-the-law-on-underage-drinking/
- World Health Organization. (2018). Global status report on alcohol and health 2018. Retrieved on 16 March 2023 from https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/274603/9789241565639-eng.pdf
Do you believe that the ICC could serve as a deterrent to international terrorism?
Given the International Criminal Court (ICC)'s current resource situation and the existing understanding of terrorism, I do not believe that the ICC could serve as an effective deterrent to international terrorism.
What is Terrorism?
There are various definitions of terrorism, yet no universally accepted definition exists. This makes it incredibly difficult to prosecute and fight terrorism, presenting an obstacle to global counter-terrorism efforts.
Instead, different nations understand terrorism as it is explained in various conventions and treaties, as well as independent scholars.
The most basic definition addresses three distinct elements.
- Violence
- Non-state actor
- Political purpose
Terrorism is, therefore, the unlawful threat or act of violence committed for a political purpose by a non-state actor.
Both the UN General Assembly and the Security Council have repeatedly condemned international terrorism as "one of the most serious threats to international peace and security."
Why Will the ICC Not Deter International Terrorism?
While some argue that the ICC may effectively deter international terrorism, the following reasons suggest otherwise.
Lack of Definition
First, there is no universally-agreed definition of terrorism which makes it difficult (and near impossible) for the ICC (or any international court or tribunal) to prosecute terrorism as a crime (Wertheim, 2003).
In addition, scholars debate whether international terrorism is a criminal act, thus implicating human rights law, or whether it surpasses the threshold for the violence of armed conflict and should be treated under humanitarian law (UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020).
Possibility of a Political Offence
Second, without a clear definition, certain acts broadly understood as terrorism could be argued as “political offenses” to avoid consequences for terrorist actions. On the opposite end of concerns, it allows alleged offenders to be punished for their political convictions or affiliations rather than alleged behavior (Wertheim, 2003).
With this in mind, introducing terrorism to the ICC jurisdiction makes it difficult to balance fundamental human rights with justice and muddies the waters of the ICC’s safeguards against political charges.
Lack of Resources
Third, the ICC has previously rejected the suggestion that drug trafficking and terrorism be included in its jurisdiction due to its lack of resources which makes it difficult to tackle such a complex crime (Wertheim, 2003). This situation has not changed, and the likelihood of the ICC deterring future terrorists through swift and severe punishment is not an effective reality.
Deterrence and Terrorism
Finally, and perhaps most notable, is that deterrence efforts do not sway the motivation for terrorist acts. When applying the rational choice theory to suicide terrorists, Perry explores a thorough cost-benefit analysis that concludes death offers significant rewards.
The possibility of punishment does not outweigh the benefit of martyrdom, which comes with religious, personal, and social rewards (2015).
What is the Solution to Terrorism?
After addressing the above concerns, there’s a possibility that the ICC could prosecute terrorists and find justice for their crimes. However, I don’t think that the ICC could deter international terrorism. So, what is to be done?
Consider Agnew’s General strain theory which suggests sub-state terrorism is most likely to occur when people experience collective strains that are high in magnitude and affecting civilians, unjust, and inflicted by significantly more powerful “others” (2010). Applying this thought process to international terrorism, it’s possible to deter terrorism by reducing these strains and considering intervening mechanisms between collective strains and crime (Agnew, 2010).
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Burkina Faso, and Syria are the top five countries with the highest terrorism index in 2021. Consider what these countries have in common — what are the strains, and how can the international community help alleviate these strains?
Another option would be prosecuting select international terrorists under one of the other ICC jurisdictions, such as crimes against humanity. But while this demonstrates an attempt at finding justice, I do not believe it will deter future terrorists.
References
- Agnew, R. (2010). A general strain theory of terrorism. Theoretical Criminology, 14(2), 131-153.
- Perry, S., & Hasisi, B. (2015). Rational choice rewards and the jihadist suicide bomber. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(1), 53-80.
- UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2020, November 13). E4J Global Podcast Series - Episode 6: Counter-Terrorism, Int'l Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. [Video] Youtube. https://youtu.be/J7N59VqwEIQ
- Vision of Humanity. (2022, October 21) Global terrorism index: Countries most impacted by terrorism. Retrieved March 12, 2023, from https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/
- Wertheim, P. J. (2003). Should “Grave Crimes of International Terrorism” be included in the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court? Policy and Society, 22(2), 1-21.